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The effectiveness of different control strategies against Foot-and-Mouth Disease 
(FMD) were investigated using epidemiological and economic models. A quick 
and large-scale vaccination within a radius of at least 2km is as effective as 
preemptive 1-km ring culling to mitigate FMD epidemics. Control measures 
should primarily target cattle farms. After the epidemic, most seropositive ani-
mals are expected on sheep farms and vaccinated cattle farms. An effective 
end-screening strategy should focus on these farms. Market acceptance by 
trade partners of products of vaccinated animals can limit the economic conse-
quences of outbreaks of FMD. 
 
De effectiviteit van bestrijdingstrategieën tegen Mond-en-Klauwzeer (MKZ) is on-
derzocht met behulp van epidemiologische en economische modellen. Het blijkt 
dat snelle en op grote schaal toegepaste vaccinatie in een straal van 2 km rond 
geïnfecteerde bedrijven net zo effectief is als ruimen in een straal van 1 km 
rond geïnfecteerde bedrijven bij het bestrijden van MKZ-uitbraken. Controlemaat-
regelen moeten vooral worden gericht op rundveebedrijven. Na de epidemie zijn 
de meeste seropositieve dieren te verwachten. De eindscreening zal zich op 
schapenbedrijven en gevaccineerde rundveebedrijven moeten richten. Accepta-
tie door internationale handelspartners van producten van gevaccineerde dieren 
kan de economische gevolgen van een uitbraak van MKZ beperken. 
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Preface 
 
 
Outbreaks of contagious animal disease have detrimental effects on the Dutch 
livestock sector as well as on Dutch society as a whole. In future outbreaks 
vaccination can be part of the control strategies. This has consequences for the 
system of diagnostics and sampling. Different control strategies differ in their 
epidemiological effects and have different economic consequences. 
 For the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) this was 
reason to ask Wageningen UR to investigate the consequences of control strate-
gies for epidemic contagious diseases. In 2007 the work on Classical Swine Fe-
ver was finished. This report shows the results of the research on Foot-and-
Mouth Disease (FMD). 
 This report is the result of a close cooperation between two institutes of 
Wageningen UR: CVI and LEI. It shows that an effective multi-disciplinary ap-
proach can lead to better insights into complex problems. 
 We hope that the results of the research towards the epidemiological and 
economic consequences of different control and eradication strategies pre-
sented in this  report can assist policy makers in choosing the optimal strategy 
in case of an outbreak of FMD. 
 We would like to thank Gert Jan Boender (CVI) for estimating the between-
herd transmission kernel and Bas Engel, Aldo Dekker, Phaedra Eblé, Clazien de 
Vos (CVI), Mart de Jong (Wageningen UR), Stephanie Wiessenhaan, Wim Pelgrim, 
Eric van der Sommen and Huibert Maurice (LNV) for the discussions during the 
project. We also thank Rolando Montessori (NZO), Bram Franke (FrieslandFoods) 
and Ruud Krimpenfort (Campina) for supplying data on milk processing. The fi-
nancial support of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality en-
abled this research and is highly appreciated. 
 
 
 
 
Andre Biachi  Prof.Dr R.B.M. Huirne 
Director CVI  Director General LEI Wageningen UR 
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Summary 
 
 
Outbreaks of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) in the Netherlands represent a ma-
jor risk to the Dutch farming industry, as around 17 million cattle, pigs and 
sheep can be infected by the virus. In many countries around the world FMD is 
still endemic. This means that there is a continuous but low risk of introduction 
of the virus in the Netherlands. As previous outbreaks of FMD have shown, an 
FMD epidemic affects a substantial part of the Dutch farming industry, resulting 
in large economic losses and a major impact on animal welfare. Whereas in the 
past outbreaks of epidemic diseases in livestock were mainly of interest for the 
agri-business, now it involves the Dutch society as a whole. There is serious 
concern within the general public about the massive culling of animals in general 
and the culling of small ruminants that are kept as pets in particular. 
 In case of an outbreak the responsible authorities must act in a quick and 
adequate way. This task has recently become more complicated given the dif-
ferent and sometimes contradictory objectives from (international) society and 
the agricultural sector. To control an ensuing epidemic as quickly as possible, 
emergency vaccination is preferred in the Netherlands to preemptive culling 
(see Dutch contingency plan FMD, 2005). However, several concerns still exist. 
For instance, there is the question whether vaccination is as effective in control-
ling the epidemic as preemptive ring culling, because vaccinated animals are 
not instantaneously protected against infection. Another concern is that vaccina-
tion increases sub-clinical infections. These sub-clinically infected animals could 
escape clinical detection during the outbreak and need to be detected serologi-
cally in the end screening. If they also escape the end screening, they could 
pose a risk to a new outbreak and to the export of livestock and meat products 
from the Netherlands (if detected later). Finally there is concern about the cost-
effectiveness and impact on animal welfare of these control strategies. 
 
Problem definition 
Since vaccination against FMD in case of an outbreak in which the animals are 
not culled after vaccination is relatively new for the Dutch situation insight is 
needed into the epidemiological and economic consequences of such a strat-
egy.  
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Research questions 
To evaluate the effectiveness of control strategies different control strategies 
were evaluated. Therefore the following questions were addressed: 
1. What is the optimal control strategy in case of an outbreak of FMD from an 
epidemiological and economic perspective? Evaluated are the control strat-
egy as required by the EU, culling within a 1-km ring, and vaccination within 
2-km or 5-km rings around detected farms. 
2. What are the consequences of alternative strategies? 
a. excluding pigs from vaccination; 
b. excluding animals on hobby farms from preemptive culling. 
3. What are the consequences for screening and declaring freedom of infection 
when different control strategies that include vaccination are applied? 
4. What is the distribution of costs between animal species and cost types? 
5. What is the lost value of products of vaccinated animals? 
 
Epidemiology of Foot-and-Mouth Disease 
The project group has evaluated the effectiveness and safety of vaccination 
strategies in controlling an FMD epidemic, taking into account the differences 
between animal species and farm sectors. For this purpose a mathematical 
model was developed that describes the within-herd and between-herd dynamics 
at two distinct levels. Results of transmission experiments and data of the FMD 
outbreak that occurred in the Netherlands in 2001 (virus strain O/Net/2001) 
served to estimate the model parameters. The model has been applied to the 
farm density situation of 2006, involving 36,000 cattle farms, 18,000 sheep 
farms, 9,000 pig farms and 20,000 hobby farms (i.e. small sheep flocks held 
for recreational purposes). Location coordinates and number of animals of each 
of these farms has been taken into account. Differences in epidemiology be-
tween commercial herd/flock types of the same animal species have not been 
taken into account. This model was used to calculate the outbreak size and du-
ration for hypothetical epidemics of FMD and to predict the number of infected 
farms and animals that escape clinical detection. Introduction of the virus was 
situated in different areas of the Netherlands on a cattle or pig farm. The results 
were used as input for a model that describes the serological testing in the end 
screening. Depending on the diagnostic test characteristics and the chosen end-
screening strategy, it predicts the number of seropositive animals (i.e. infected 
but not infectious animals with a detectable anti-body response) that will remain 
when the country has been declared free of infection. 
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Model discussion  
Models are frequently used to calculate the consequences of different control-
strategy scenarios. They are based upon the most recent scientific insights into 
the spread of the disease and the effects of control strategies. Because the 
Netherlands only suffered incidental outbreaks of FMD, not all the required data 
for the used model were available. The input data are therefore partly based on 
reasoned assumptions. These models contain the most recent scientific insights 
into the spread of the disease and the effects of control strategies. However, 
some input data for the current situation in the Netherlands were not available, 
because the Netherlands only suffered incidental epidemics of FMD. These input 
data were based on reasoned assumptions. Furthermore, some input data (like 
the between-herd transmission) were only available for virus strain O/NET/2001. 
The overall results as shown in table 1.C should thus be seen as the best possi-
ble estimates of the effects of different control strategies, given these practical 
limitations. The resulting insight provides a basis for the discussion about the 
optimal control strategy for FMD in the Netherlands. 
 
Control strategies 
Several control strategies have been evaluated by simulating 1,000 hypothetical 
epidemics for each strategy. Table 1.A summarises the results of three control 
strategies, when the epidemic starts on a cattle farm in the Gelderse Vallei 
(i.e. a cattle- and pig-dense area of about 4 farms/km2) and 10 farms have been 
infected by the source herd. 
 
Freedom of infection 
Before the country can be declared free of infection, the EU requires all animals 
on all vaccinated farms to be serologically tested, as well as samples of sheep 
on unvaccinated farms. Table 1.B summarises the results for this end-screening 
strategy for three basic control strategies (for epidemics that started on a cattle 
farm in the Gelderse Vallei). 
 
Economic consequences of different control strategies 
The different strategies were also evaluated from an economic perspective. To 
evaluate the economic consequences of the different control and eradication 
strategies a Partial Budget model was developed. In such a model only the 
costs and benefits that differ between the evaluated alternatives are included. 
The results of the calculations are summarised in table 1.C. The calculated 
costs of the evaluated strategies were lower than the reported costs of the last 
epidemic in the Netherlands, which only involved 26 detected farms. This is be-
11 
cause the Partial Budget method used in this study only takes into account the 
costs that differ between the control strategies. For example, costs related to 
tourism and those that depend on an epidemic per se, irrespective of the con-
trol strategy, were not included in the costs calculated in this study. 
 It is difficult to predict the effect of a specific FMD introduction in the Nether-
lands. Chance plays an important role at the start and during an epidemic. In the 
epidemiological model probability is used to model this. Due to chance there is 
a wide variety of possible outcomes. Using multiple model runs provides insight 
into this variation. It is assumed that an actual epidemic (with a comparable vi-
rus strain) will fall within the simulated variation. 
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Interpretation of the economic results 
Interpretation of the economic results depends on the risk attitude of the deci-
sion maker. A risk-neutral decision maker is assumed to choose a strategy that 
on average has the lowest costs. A risk-averse decision maker is assumed to 
base the decision on minimising the chance of unpleasant outcomes. 
 To support the risk-neutral decision maker we present the 50% percentile of 
the costs. This means that 50% of the simulated epidemics have calculated 
costs that are less than or equal to the presented number. For the risk-avoiding 
decision maker the 95% percentile of the costs may be the better choice. This 
means that 95% of the simulated epidemics have calculated costs that are less 
than or equal to the presented number. Only in 5% of the simulated outcomes 
arethe costs higher. To represent the costs in a 'best case scenario' the 5% 
percentile of the costs were selected. 
 A specific feature of the used simulation method is that the decision maker 
is supposed to stick to the strategy on which he decided at the start of the epi-
demic. In reality, a process of monitoring and adapting the control strategy 
based on a series of decisions is more likely to occur. Or, as Ge (2008) puts it: 
'The epidemic can only be understood backwards, but it must be controlled 
forward.' 
 The economic results suggest that several control measures themselves in-
cur high costs. For example, vaccinating in a 5-km ring around a detected farm 
results in high numbers of vaccinated animals and large amounts of products of 
vaccinated animals that have to be processed separately. A decision maker can 
decide on a control strategy with relatively cheap measures at the start of an 
epidemic and additional, more costly measures during the epidemic to prevent 
an explosion. This can result in a more cost efficient control than a massive re-
sponse at the start of an epidemic. 
 This means that measures which have an irreversible effect and a big im-
pact, e.g. culling or vaccinating a large number of animals, should be taken cau-
tiously but timely. To enable such dynamic decisions, it should be clear what 
information is needed at what moment in the decision process. This information 
need should of course be met with adequate data collection. Furthermore, con-
trol measures should be implemented in a 'smart' way. For example, when it is 
decided to vaccinate one could start with a 2-km circle and only expand this cir-
cle to a 5-km ring when needed. 
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Ripple and spill-over effects 
In addition to the direct costs of the epidemic for farmers, ripple and spill-over 
effects are likely to occur. Ripple effects are the effects of an epidemic that are 
felt up- and downstream along the livestock value chain: breeding, feed produc-
tion, input supply, slaughter, processing, final sale and consumption. For exam-
ple, the stand-still measures in infected compartments prevent the slaughter of 
animals for at least six weeks. This can seriously affect the supply of slaughter-
houses, especially when multiple compartments are affected. In previous epi-
demics of FMD in the Netherlands this caused a temporary production stop in 
slaughterhouses. This problem is especially prevalent for veal calves. For the 
pig industry it might be a somewhat different picture, because currently large 
numbers of slaughter pigs are exported alive. In case of an epidemic live export 
of slaughter animals will not be possible. The additional supply of pigs that now 
have to be slaughtered within the Netherlands might compensate the stagnating 
supply from infected compartments. 
 Due to an epidemic the market access for products of susceptible species 
is seriously restricted. An epidemic of FMD will result in trade restrictions that 
are related to the epidemic per se and do not depend on the specific character-
istics of the chosen control strategy. After the last detection it takes time to 
remove all the restrictions in trade and the situation regarding export of animals 
and products is back to what it was before the epidemic. An epidemic of FMD 
can have serious consequences, especially for the Dutch pig sector, because of 
the export of large numbers of live pigs. These pigs must then be sold in the 
Netherlands. It can therefore be expected that prices in the areas affected by 
restrictions will fall. 
 Spill-over effects are the effects of an epidemic of FMD on non-agricultural 
sectors such as tourism and other services. Because non-agricultural produc-
tion is increasingly important for the rural economy, spill-over effects are likely 
to have an increasing effect on the total costs of an epidemic. In the last out-
break of FMD in the Netherlands in 2001 the costs for the tourist sector alone 
were estimated at €275m. 
 
Conclusions regarding control strategies 
- Additional measures such as preemptive culling or vaccination are neces-
sary to control the epidemic in densely populated livestock areas (DPLA) 
(>3 farms per km2) such as in Gelderse Vallei and Noord-Brabant, whereas in 
sparsely populated livestock areas (SPLA) (of about 2 farms per km2), such 
as in Friesland, the minimal (EU) control strategy is sufficient. 
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- In densely populated livestock areas 2-km ring vaccination is much more ef-
fective than the minimal strategy required by the EU, but less effective than 
1-km ring culling in terms of epidemic size and duration. 
- In densely populated livestock areas 5-km ring vaccination and 1-km ring 
culling are equally effective (when vaccination capacity is not limiting). 
- In the first stages of controlling the epidemic, the required culling capacity is 
18 (0-83) farms per day for the 1-km ring culling strategy. The required vac-
cination capacity is 53 (0-237) farms per day for the 2-km vaccination strat-
egy and 149 (0-800) farms per day for the 5-km vaccination strategy. 
- At least 75% of the infected farms are cattle farms, even in pig-dense areas, 
regardless of the control strategy. 
- Excluding hobby farms (here small sheep flocks of 10 animals, physically 
separated from commercial farms) from preemptive culling has a negligible 
effect on epidemic control. In the ring culling strategy, it reduces the number 
of farms to be culled by 20% (and the number of animals to be culled by 
3%). 
- Excluding pig farms from vaccination causes a significant but limited in-
crease of both epidemic size and duration (for the virus strain under study). 
The number of animals to be vaccinated is more than halved. Whether this 
strategy is economically beneficial despite the increased risk, is evaluated in 
the economic analysis. 
- A fraction of the infected farms remains undetected during the epidemic 
(around 9% for the minimal strategy and around 5% for the culling strategy), 
consisting mainly of unvaccinated sheep farms. This percentage is between 
11 and 20 for vaccination strategies, involving mainly vaccinated cattle and 
sheep farms. 
 
Conclusions regarding end screening 
- In non-vaccination strategies 1,000-5,000 farms need to be tested in the 
end screening, while vaccination strategies require twice as many farms 
(2,000-11,000) to be tested. 
- About half of the tested farms must be retested to exclude or confirm infec-
tion (because of false positive test results). 
- Before the end screening, vaccination yields approximately 5 times as many 
seropositive animals as ring culling (seropositive for non structural FMD pro-
teins, as detected by an NS Elisa). 
- After the end-screening according to the EU legislation, the number of sero-
positive animals is similar for 1-km ring culling and 5-km ring vaccination, 
and slightly higher for 2-km ring vaccination. The average numbers of sero-
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positive animals vary between 1.0 and 3.5. If these numbers of seropositive 
animals are considered to represent an acceptable risk, emergency vaccina-
tion would be a safe alternative to preemptive culling. 
- Compared to the screening required by the EU, screening strategies in 
which more effort is placed on unvaccinated cattle and pig farms (testing a 
sample instead of none), do not improve the detection of seropositive ani-
mals, so implementation of this alternative end-screening strategy does not 
add value. 
- Compared to the screening required by the EU, screening strategies in 
which less effort is placed on vaccinated pig farms (testing a sample instead 
of all), do not worsen the detection of seropositive animals, so this alterna-
tive end screening can be safely implemented. 
 
Conclusions regarding economic consequences 
- What is the optimal strategy: culling, 2-km or 5-km vaccination? Culling strat-
egy is the economically preferred strategy in SPLAs. Vaccination is the eco-
nomically preferred strategy in DPLAs. 
- In DPLAs with vey high densities of livestock vaccination within a radius of 
5km around detected farms results in the lowest costs whereas in other 
DPLAs vaccination of 2km around detected farms results in the lowest 
costs. 
- Alternative strategies: excluding pigs from vaccination and excluding animals 
on hobby farms from preventive culling. 
When vaccination is chosen as strategy in DPLA regions, excluding pigs 
from vaccination should be seriously considered since there is a relevant re-
duction in costs. 
- Abolishing preventive culling of animals on hobby farms (i.e. small sheep 
flocks with less than 10 sheep held for recreational purposes) should seri-
ously be considered. Preventive culling of animals on hobby farms does not 
attribute much to a faster elimination of the epidemic but contributes a lot to 
the negative perception of the public towards the needed interventions. Ex-
cluding animals on hobby farms from preventive culling does not substan-
tially affect the costs of an epidemic but it improves the societal acceptance 
of the eradication strategies. 
 
Distribution of costs 
The dairy industry, veal calve industry and the pig industry all suffer a lot from 
an FMD epidemic. Although vaccination can limit the costs of an epidemic it also 
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introduces the potential problem of reduced market access for products from 
vaccinated animals. 
For the dairy industry a large part of the costs originate from the inability to 
create value from side products of the processing of milk from vaccinated 
cows. 
For the veal calve industry the highest costs originate from animals getting 
older than eight months at slaughter during an epidemic, so that their meat 
cannot be sold as white veal. 
For the pig industry the highest costs originate from the reduced market ac-
ceptance of animals and their products from infected compartments by (interna-
tional) trade partners. 
 
Value loss due to vaccination 
Market acceptance by the trade partners of products originating from vacci-
nated animals might cushion the economic effects of an epidemic. An integrated 
effort of the government and the livestock industry to limit the consequences of 
an epidemic of FMD to inform the trade partners about the Dutch approach to 
fight the disease is needed. 
A coordinated action between the relevant stakeholders during an epidemic 
can reduce the value loss of milk from vaccinated dairy cows. Logistic coopera-
tion between dairy companies can reduce the logistic costs and limit the num-
ber of locations where the milk from vaccinated animals has to be processed. 
Consultations need to be initiated with the trade partners on the market accep-
tance of products from vaccinated animals. 
Insight into ways to reduce the value loss of products of vaccinated animals 
with a focus on cattle (dairy products and veal calves) is needed to decrease 
the potential costs of a vaccination strategy to eradicate a FMD epidemic. 
 In conclusion, vaccination is as effective as preemptive 1-km ring culling to 
mitigate FMD epidemics, provided it can be applied quickly and on a large scale, 
especially in densely populated livestock areas. Control measures should pri-
marily target cattle farms, as these seem to play the largest role in the epi-
demic (for the virus strain under study). After the epidemic, most seropositive 
animals are expected on sheep farms and vaccinated cattle farms. An effective 
end-screening strategy should focus on these farms. Market acceptance by 
trade partners of products of vaccinated animals can limit the economic conse-
quences of outbreaks of FMD. 
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Samenvatting 
Vaccinatie tegen mond- en klauwzeer; Verschillende  
strategieën en hun epidemiologische en economische  
gevolgen 
 
 
Uitbraken van Mond-en-Klauwzeer (MKZ) in Nederland zijn een bedreiging voor 
de Nederlandse veehouderij: ongeveer 17 miljoen koeien, varkens en schapen 
kunnen mogelijk worden geïnfecteerd met het virus. MKZ komt nog steeds en-
demisch voor in veel landen. Dit betekent dat er een continu maar klein risico is 
op de introductie van het virus in Nederland. Zoals voorgaande uitbraken van 
MKZ hebben laten zien, heeft een uitbraak voor de Nederlandse veehouderij gro-
te gevolgen. Er zijn grote economische verliezen en grote gevolgen voor het 
dierenwelzijn. Was in het verleden een uitbraak van MKZ iets wat vooral van be-
lang was voor de agrarische sector, nu wordt de gehele samenleving er door 
getroffen. Er is weerstand tegen het massale doden van dieren in het algemeen 
en het doden van kleine herhauwers die als huisdier worden gehouden in het bij-
zonder. 
 In het geval van een uitbraak wordt van de verantwoordelijke autoriteiten 
verwacht dat ze snel en adequaat handelen. Deze taak is er niet eenvoudiger op 
geworden in het licht van de soms tegenstrijdige belangen van de (internation-
ale) samenleving en de agrarische sector. Bij de bestrijding van een uitbraak van 
MKZ heeft noodvaccinatie de voorkeur boven preventief ruimen (zie Beleids-
draaiboek MKZ 2005). Maar er blijven nog zorgen. Bijvoorbeeld de vraag of 
vaccinatie net zo effectief is bij het onder controle brengen van de epidemie 
als preventief ruimen; gevaccineerde dieren zijn immers niet onmiddellijk be-
schermd tegen infecties. Een andere zorg is dat vaccinatie mogelijk leidt tot 
subklinische infecties. Deze subklinisch geïnfecteerde dieren worden mogelijk 
niet opgemerkt bij klinische inspecties en moeten worden opgespoord met sero-
logisch onderzoek bij de eindscreening. Als ze dan ook niet worden opgemerkt 
zouden ze mogelijk een risico vormen voor een nieuwe uitbraak of voor de ex-
port van dieren en hun producten (als ze later alsnog worden opgespoord). Als 
laatste is de kosteneffectiviteit en de invloed op dieren welzijn van belang. 
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Probleemstelling 
Er is meer inzicht nodig in de epidemiologische en economische gevolgen van 
een aanpak waarbij vaccinatie tegen MKZ als  bestrijdingstrategie wordt ingezet 
waarbij de dieren na de gevaccineerde dieren niet na de uitbraak alsnog ge-
ruimd worden. Dit omdat een dergelijke aanpak relatief nieuw is voor de Neder-
landse situatie. 
 
Onderzoeksvragen 
Om meer inzicht te krijgen in de effectiviteit van de verschillende controlestrate-
gieën tegen Mond-en-Klauwzeer zijn de volgende onderzoeksvragen gesteld: 
1. Wat is de optimale controlestrategie in geval van een uitbraak van Mond-en-
Klauwzeer? Hiervoor zijn conrolestrategieën waarbij gevaccineerd is in 2 of 
5 km rond geïnfecteerde bedrijven vergeleken met de (minimale) EU-
strategie of met ruimen in 1 km rond geïnfecteerde bedrijven. 
2. Wat zijn de gevolgen van alternatieve controlestrategieën? Hiervoor zijn per 
vaccinatiestrategie de gevolgen van 2 alternatieve scenario's berekend: 
a. als tijdens de vaccinatiestrategie de varkensbedrijven niet worden ge-
vaccineerd; 
b. als op de hobbybedrijven ruiming achterwege wordt gelaten. 
3. Wat zijn de gevolgen voor screening en vrijverklaren van infectie bij verschil-
lende vaccinatiestrategieën? 
4. Wat is de verdeling van de kosten tussen de verschillende diersoorten en de 
omvang van deze kosten?  
5. Wat is het waardeverlies van de producten van gevaccineerde dieren? 
 
 De epidemiologisch en economische gevolgen zijn beoordeeld aan de hand 
van modelberekeningen. 
 
Epidemiologisch gevolgen van Mond-en-Klauwzeer 
De effectiviteit en veiligheid van vaccinatiestrategieën voor de controle van een 
MKZ-epidemie zijn onderzocht. Hierbij is met verschillen tussen diersoorten en 
veehouderijsectoren rekening gehouden. Een wiskundig model is ontwikkeld dat 
MKZ-besmettingen binnen bedrijven en tussen bedrijven in kaart brengt. Hierbij 
is gebruik gemaakt van de gegevens die afkomstig zijn van recente experimen-
ten en uitbraken in Nederland in 2001 (virus strain O/Net/2001). In het model is 
gebruik gemaakt van de bedrijfsgegevens van 2006, waarbij locatie en bedrijfs-
omvanggegevens van 36.000 rundvee-, 18.000 schapen- en 9.000 varkens-
bedrijven zijn opgenomen evenals 20.000 hobbybedrijven (schapenbedrijven van 
beperkte omvang die voor recreatie worden gehouden). Het model houdt geen 
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rekening met eventuele verschillen in epidemiologie binnen een bepaalde dier-
soort of een bepaald bedrijfstype. Het model is gebruikt om de omvang (aantal 
geïnfecteerde bedrijven) en de duur van een hypothetische uitbraak te 
berekenen. Ook berekent het model het aantal geïnfecteerde bedrijven en di-
eren die aan klinische inspectie ontsnappen. De hypothetische uitbraken in het 
model zijn gestart door introductie van het MKZ-virus op verschillende typen be-
drijven in verschillende regio's in Nederland. De resultaten van de uitbraaksimu-
latie zijn gebruikt in een model dat de serologische testen en eindscreening 
modelleert. Afhankelijk van testeigenschappen en de gekozen eindscreenings-
strategie wordt het aantal seropositieve dieren voorspeld (geïnfecteerd maar 
niet infectieus met een waarneembare antilichaamrespons) die aanwezig blijven 
op het moment dat Nederland weer officieel is vrijverklaard na de uitbraak. 
 
Modeldiscussie 
Modellen worden vaak gebruikt om de gevolgen van bestrijdingstrategieën te 
berekenen. Zij zijn gebaseerd op de meest recente inzichten in de spreiding van 
de ziekte en de effecten van controlestrategieën. Omdat Nederland gelukkig 
maar incidenteel te maken heeft met uitbraken van MKZ zijn niet alle benodigde 
data voor het model op grond van gegevens van recente uitbraken beschikbaar. 
Hierdoor zijn de inputdata gedeeltelijk gebaseerd op beredeneerde aannames. 
Bovendien waren de data die beschikbar zijn over de transmissie alleen beschik-
baar voor de virusstam O/NET/2001. De resultaten zoals weergegeven in ta-
bel 1.A moeten daarom worden gezien als beste mogelijke schattingen binnen 
de gegeven beperkingen. De inzichten op basis van de modelberekeningen kun-
nen wel de basis vormen voor de optimale controlestrategie in Nederland. 
Controlestrategieën 
Verschillende mogelijke controlestrategieën zijn geëvalueerd door 1.000 hypo-
thetische epidemieën te simuleren voor iedere onderzochte controlestrategie. 
Uitbraken met start in Friesland (start rundvee), Gelderse Vallei (start of rund-
vee of varkens), Oost-Nederland (start rundvee) of Noord-Brabant (start var-
kens) zijn gemodelleerd. Tabel 1.A vat de resultaten van drie controlestrate-
gieën, die beginnen op een rundvee bedrijf in de Gelderse Vallei samen. De 
Gelderse Vallei is een rundvee en varkensdicht gebied met ongeveer 4 bedrij-
ven per km2 waarbij het eerste bedrijf al 10 bedrijven heeft besmet voordat de 
infectie wordt opgemerkt. 
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Vrij zijn van infectie 
Voordat een land vrij van infectie verklaard kan worden verlangt de EU dat alle 
dieren op alle gevaccineerde bedrijven serologisch getest worden. Bovendien 
moeten steekproefsgewijs schapen op ongevaccineerde bedrijven getest 
worden. Tabel 1.B vat de resultaten van deze eindscreening van drie controle-
strategieën, die beginnen op een rundveebedrijf in de Gelderse Vallei samen. 
Economische gevolgen van verschillende controlestrategieën 
Naast epidemiologisch zijn de verschillende strategieën ook gevaluteerd vanuit 
een economisch perspectief. Hiervoor is een Partial Budget-model gemaakt. 
In zo'n model worden alleen de kosten en baten die verschillen tussen de ver-
schillende alternatieven meegenomen. De berekende kosten zijn samengevat in 
tabel 1.C. 
 De gecalculeerde kosten van de onderzochte strategieën zijn lager dan de 
kosten van de laatste uitbraak in 2001, die slechts 26 gedetecteerde bedrijven 
betrof. De reden is dat de kosten die voor alle strategieën gelijk blijven (bijvoor-
beeld kosten voor toerisme en die kosten die te maken hebben met een uit-
braak) per se onafhankelijk van de toegepaste bestrijdingsstrategie in de 
berekende kosten in deze studie niet zijn meegenomen. Het is moeilijk de ge-
volgen van een uitbraak in Nederland te voorspellen, toeval speelt een belangri-
jke rol bij het begin van een epidemie. In het epidemiologische model is gebruik 
gemaakt van kansen om dit te modelleren. Door deze kansen ontstaat een 
grote variatie in mogelijke uitkomsten. Door het model vele malen te laten 
rekenen kan er inzicht in deze variatie worden gekregen. We nemen aan dat uit-
komst van een eventuele echte uitbraak (met een vergelijkbare virusstam) bin-
nen deze berekende variatie valt. 
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Interpretatie van de economische resultaten 
De interpretatie van de economische resultaten is afhankelijk van de risicohou-
ding van de beslisser. Een risiconeutrale beslisser wordt verondersteld die 
strategie te kiezen die gemiddeld de laagste kosten geeft. Een risicomijdende 
beslisser wordt verondersteld te kiezen voor die strategie die de kleinste kans 
op ongunstige uitkomsten geeft. Om de risiconeutrale beslisser te ondersteunen 
worden de 50% percentiel of mediane waarde gegeven. Dit betekent dat 50% 
van de modeluitkomsten lager dan of gelijk aan de gepresenteerde waarde zijn. 
Voor de risicomijdende beslisser zal de 95% percentiel mogelijk een betere 
keuze zijn. Vijfennegentig procent van de uitkomsten is lager dan of gelijk aan 
de gegeven waarde, in 5% van de gevallen zal de uitkomst hoger zijn. Om in-
zicht te krijgen in het geval van een 'best case scenario' zijn de 5% percentiel-
waarden gegeven. 
 Een specifiek kenmerk van de gebruikte simulatiemethodes is dat de beslis-
ser wordt geacht tijdens de hele epidemie vast te houden aan de keuze die aan 
het begin van de epidemie is gemaakt. In werkelijkheid zal een proces van moni-
toring en aanpassen van de controlestrategie optreden. 
 De resultaten van de economische berekeningen suggereren dat het instel-
len van de bestrijdingsstrategie al met hoge kosten gepaard gaat. Bijvoorbeeld 
vaccineren in een ring van 5 km rond geïnfecteerde bedrijven resulteert in grote 
aantallen gevaccineerde dieren waarvan de producten apart verwerkt moeten 
worden. Een beslisser kan daarom besluiten om relatief goedkope maatregelen 
aan het begin te nemen en eventueel duurdere maatregelen later om een grote 
uitbreiding van de epidemie te voorkomen. Een dergelijke aanpak kan een meer 
kosteneffectieve aanpak tot gevolg hebben dan een massale respons aan het 
begin van de uitbraak. Dit betekent dat maatregelen die onomkeerbaar zijn en 
grotere gevolgen hebben (bijvoorbeeld ruimen of vaccineren) voorzichtig maar 
tijdig genomen moeten worden. Om zulke dynamische beslissingen te kunnen 
nemen moet op voorhand bekend zijn welke informatie op welk moment van de 
besluitvorming aanwezig moet zijn. Deze informatiebehoefte moet ondersteund 
worden met adequate gegevensverzameling. Bovendien moeten maatregelen 
'slim' geïmplementeerd worden. Bijvoorbeeld als gekozen wordt voor vaccinatie 
kan men beter kiezen om te beginnen met een cirkel van 2 km die indien nodig 
uitgebreid wordt naar 5 km. 
 
Bijkomende gevolgen van een uitbraak 
Naast de directe kosten van een epidemie voor veehouders zijn er ook bijko-
mende gevolgen verderop in de keten. Fokkerij, voerproductie, slachthuizen, re-
tail en consumenten worden mogelijk met de gevolgen van een uitbraak 
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geconfronteerd. Bijvoorbeeld de standstill-periode in besmette compartimenten 
maakt het voor 6 weken onmogelijk dieren uit deze gebieden te slachten. Zeker 
als er meerdere compartimenten zijn besmet kan dit grote gevolgen hebben 
voor de aanvoer van slachthuizen. Dit geldt vooral voor de blankkalfsvleessec-
tor. Voor de varkenssector is er mogelijk sprake van een iets ander beeld om-
dat op het ogenblik grote hoeveelheden Nederlandse vleesvarkens in het 
buitenland worden geslacht. Een verbod voor heel Nederland voor levende ex-
port kan een extra aanbod voor de Nederlandse slachthuizen betekenen. Dit ex-
tra aanbod kan de stagnerende aanvoer vanuit geïnfecteerde compartimenten 
compenseren. 
 Een uitbraak van MKZ zal exportrestricties tot gevolg hebben die gedeeltelijk 
gerelateerd zullen zijn aan een uitbraak van MKZ en niet zozeer aan de keuze 
van de bestrijdingsstrategie. Na het einde van de een uitbraak en als alle beper-
kingen zijn opgeheven gaat er geruime tijd overheen voordat de situatie weer 
die is van voor de epidemie. Vooral voor de varkenssector kunnen de gevolgen 
groot zijn vanwege de grote export van levende biggen en vleesvarkens. Deze 
varkens zullen nu tijdelijk in Nederland verkocht moeten worden. De verwachting 
is dat de prijzen in gebieden met exportrestricties sterk zullen dalen. 
 Naast de effecten in de keten zijn er ook mogelijke gevolgen voor andere 
sectoren als toerisme en andere diensten. Omdat niet-agrarische economische 
activiteiten in belang toenemen voor het landelijk gebied zullen deze effecten in 
belang toenemen. Bij de laatste uitbraak van MKZ in Nederland zijn de kosten 
voor de toeristensector geschat op 275 miljoen euro. 
 
Conclusies met betrekking tot de controlestrategieën 
- Op basis van de modelberekeningen kan worden geconcludeerd dat aanvul-
lende maatregelen op de minimale EU-strategie zoals extra ruimen of vacci-
neren nodig zijn om een uitbraak van MKZ te kunnen controleren in gebieden 
met hoge bedrijfsdichtheid (DPLA) (>3 bedrijven/km2) zoals de Gelderse Val-
lei en Noord-Brabant. Echter, in gebieden met een lage dichtheid (SPLA)(<3 
bedrijven/km2), zoals in Friesland, lijkt de minimale EU-strategie afdoende. 
- Als wordt gekeken naar omvang van de epidemie en uitbraakduur dan is in 
gebieden met een hoge bedrijfsdichtheid (DPLA): (a) vaccineren in een straal 
van 2 km rond geïnfecteerde bedrijven effectiever dan het minimale EU-
scenario, maar minder effectief dan 1 km ruimen en (b) vaccineren in een 
straal van 5 km rond geïnfecteerde bedrijven even effectief als ruimen in een 
straal van 1 km. 
- In de beginfase van het controleren van de epidemie is de benodigde rui-
mingscapaciteit 18 (0-83) bedrijven per dag voor ruimen in 1 km. De beno-
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digde vaccinatiecapaciteit is 53 (0-237) bedrijven per dag voor de 2-km-
vaccinatiestrategie en 149 (0-800) bedrijven voor de 5-km-vaccinatie-
strategie. 
- Vijfenzeventig procent van alle geïnfecteerde bedrijven zijn rundveebedrijven 
(onafhankelijk van de varkensdichtheid in een bepaald gebied). 
- Uitsluiten van hobbybedrijven (in dit onderzoek bedrijven met 10 schapen die 
gescheiden zijn van commerciële bedrijven) van preventief ruimen heeft een 
verwaarloosbaar effect op de controle van de epidemie. In de strategie rui-
men in een straal van 1 km reduceert dit het aantal te ruimen bedrijven met 
20% (en het aantal te ruimen dieren met 3%). 
- Het uitsluiten van varkensbedrijven van vaccinatie geeft een beperkte toe-
name van omvang en duur van de epidemie (voor het onderzochte virus). 
Bovendien halveert het aantal te vaccineren dieren. 
- Een aantal geïnfecteerde bedrijven wordt niet gedetecteerd tijdens de uit-
braak. Deze bedrijven zullen tijdens de screeningsfase op het einde van de 
uitbraak opgespoord moeten worden. Het percentage bedrijven dat niet 
wordt opgespoord is ongeveer 9 bij de EU-strategie en 5 bij de ruimingstra-
tegie (dit zijn vooral schapenbedrijven). Bij de vaccinatiestrategieën varieert 
dit percentage tussen 11 en 20 (dit zijn vooral gevaccineerde rundvee- en 
schapenbedrijven). 
 
Conclusies met betrekking tot eindscreening 
- In non-vaccinatiestrategieën moeten 1.000 tot 5.000 bedrijven worden ge-
test in de eindscreening, terwijl een dubbel aantal bedrijven (2.000-11.000) 
moet worden onderzocht bij vaccinatiestrategieën. 
- Ongeveer de helft van de onderzochte bedrijven moet worden hertest om in-
fectie te bevestigen of uit te sluiten (vals-positieve testuitkomsten). 
- Vaccinatie geeft 5 maal zo veel positieve dieren (in een NS-ELISA voor non-
structural MKZ-eiwitten) voor de eindscreening als ruimen in een cirkel van 
1 km. 
- Na de eindscreening, zoals voorgeschreven door de EU, is het verwachte 
aantal positieve dieren gelijk voor de '1-km ruimen' en de '5-km vaccineren' 
strategie en gering hoger voor de '2-km-vaccinatiestrategie'. 
- Screeningstrategieën, waarbij meer dan in de door de EU voorgeschreven 
strategie aandacht wordt gegeven aan het testen van niet-gevaccineerde 
rundvee- en varkensbedrijven (testen van steekproef in plaats van niet tes-
ten), verbeteren het opsporen van seropositieve dieren niet en heeft geen 
toegevoegde waarde. 
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- Screeningstrategieën, waarbij minder dan in de door de EU voorgeschreven 
strategie aandacht wordt gegeven aan het testen van gevaccineerde var-
kensbedrijven (een steekproef in plaats van alle dieren), hebben geen nade-
lige invloed op de detectie van seropositeve dieren en kan veilig worden 
geïmplementeerd. 
 
Conclusies met betrekking tot de economische gevolgen 
Met betrekking tot de reguliere bestrijdingsstrategieën, waarbij varkens ook 
worden gevaccineerd en gevoelige dieren op hobbybedrijven worden geruimd, 
kan worden geconcludeerd dat: ?
in SPLA-gebieden ruimen in 1 km rond geïnfecteerde bedrijven de voorkeur 
heeft boven vaccineren. In DPLA-gebieden heeft vaccineren de voorkeur; ?
in DPLA-gebieden met een hoge veedichtheid vaccinatie in een ring van 5 km 
lagere kosten heeft dan vaccinatie in een ring van 2 km. 
 
 Met betrekking tot alternatieve bestrijdingsstrategieën, waarbij varkens niet 
worden gevaccineerd of gevoelige dieren op hobbybedrijven niet worden ge-
ruimd, kan worden geconcludeerd dat: ?
als gekozen wordt om gevoelige dieren te gaan vaccineren als bestrijdings-
strategie in DPLA-gebieden, het niet vaccineren van varkens serieus over-
wogen moet worden gezien de hiermee gepaard gaande substantiële 
reductie in kosten; ?
afzien van preventief ruimen op hobbybedrijven moet worden overwogen. 
Preventief ruimen van de dieren op deze bedrijven draagt slechts in geringe 
mate bij aan de snellere eliminatie van de epidemie. Maar het draagt wel in 
belangrijke mate bij aan de negatieve perceptie van het publiek met betrek-
king tot de benodigde interventiemaatregelen. Het niet preventief ruimen van 
dieren op hobbybedrijven heeft geen substantiële invloed op de kosten van 
de uitbraak, maar bevordert de acceptatie van de samenleving voor de be-
strijdingsstrategieën. 
 
 Met betrekking tot de verdeling van kosten kan worden geconcludeerd dat: ?
de zuivelsector, de vleeskalversector en de varkenssector alle grote schade 
ondervinden bij een uitbraak van MKZ. Hoewel vaccinatie de kosten van de 
epidemie kan beperken, brengt vaccinatie ook het mogelijke probleem met 
zich mee van verminderde markttoegang van producten van gevaccineerde 
dieren; 
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?
voor de zuivelsector een groot deel van de kosten ontstaat bij vaccinatie 
doordat het niet mogelijk is een aantal bijproducten van de zuivelverwerking 
van melk van gevaccineerde koeien optimaal te verwaarden; ?
voor de vleeskalverindustrie de hoogste kosten ontstaan bij dieren die tij-
dens de uitbraak ouder worden dan acht maanden worden. Hun vlees kan 
niet meer als blank kalfsvlees worden afgezet; ?
voor de varkenssector de hoogste kosten voortkomen uit de verminderde 
acceptatie van dieren en hun producten van de geïnfecteerde compartimen-
ten door (internationale) handelspartners. 
 Met betrekking tot waardeverlies ten gevolge van vaccinatie kan worden ge-
concludeerd dat:  ?
acceptatie door internationale handelspartners van producten van gevacci-
neerde dieren de economische gevolgen van een uitbraak kan beperken. 
Een gezamenlijke inspanning van de overheid en de veehouderijsectoren om 
handelspartners over de Nederlandse aanpak te informeren is nodig; ?
een gecoördineerde actie van de relevante stakeholders gedurende een epi-
demie het waardeverlies van producten van gevaccineerde dieren kan be-
perken. Logistieke samenwerking kan de kosten beperken en verminderd 
het aantal locaties waar producten moeten worden verwerkt; ?
inzicht in de wijze waarop het waardeverlies van producten van gevaccineer-
de dieren (zuivel en vleeskalveren) kan worden beperkt, nodig is om de po-
tentiële schade van een vaccinatiestrategie te verminderen. 
 
Samenvattend 
Vaccinatie is zeker zo effectief als ruimen in een straal van 1 km rond geïnfec-
teerde bedrijven bij het bestrijden van MKZ-uitbraken. Voorwaarde is wel dat de 
vaccinatie snel en op grote schaal kan worden toegepast, vooral in veedichte 
gebieden. Controle maatregelen moeten vooral worden gericht op rundveebe-
drijven, omdat zij de belangrijkste rol spelen in de epidemie (in ieder geval voor 
de in dit onderzoek aangenomen eigenschappen van de virusstam). Na de epi-
demie zijn de meeste seropositieve dieren zijn te verwachten op schapenbe-
drijven en gevaccineerde rundveebedrijven. Een effectieve strategie voor de 
eindscreening zal zich dan ook op deze bedrijven moeten richten. Acceptatie 
door internationale handelspartners van producten van gevaccineerde dieren 
kan de economische gevolgen van een uitbraak beperken. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
In the Netherlands around 17m. farm animals are at risk of being infected by 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD), as all even-toed ungulates (artiodactyls), such as 
cattle, sheep, goats and pigs, are susceptible to the virus. In many countries 
around the world FMD is still endemic. This means that there is a continuous but 
low risk of introduction of the virus in the Netherlands. As previous outbreaks of 
FMD have shown, an FMD epidemic affects a substantial part of the Dutch farm-
ing industry, resulting in large economic losses and a major impact on animal 
welfare. Where in the past outbreaks of epidemic diseases in livestock were 
mainly of interest to the agri-sector, now it involves the Dutch society as a 
whole. For example, during the 2001 outbreak in the UK and the Netherlands 
the tourist sector in infected areas suffered heavily. There also was serious 
concern within the general public about the massive culling of animals in general 
and the culling of small ruminants that were kept as pets in particular. 
 It is the task of the responsible authorities in case of an outbreak to act in a 
quick and adequate way. This task has become more complicated recently 
given the different and sometimes contrary objectives that (international) society 
and agricultural sector have. Different options for the most effective strategies 
have to be evaluated. The results of the research towards the epidemiological 
and economic consequences of different control and eradication strategies pre-
sented in this report can assist policy makers in choosing the optimal strategy 
in case of an outbreak of FMD. 
 
FMD outbreaks and their control 
When an outbreak of FMD is first detected measures need to be taken to con-
trol the outbreak. This detection occurs after a period of 'silent spread' (or High 
Risk Period (HRP)) since the introduction in the Netherlands. EU regulations de-
mand the culling of detected infection sources, regulation of transport and trac-
ing (and possibly culling) of dangerous contacts. When these measures are 
insufficient to stop FMD spread, additional measures such as preemptive culling 
or vaccination are necessary to halt the epidemic in a minimal time span. This 
happened during the FMD epidemic in the Netherlands in 2001, when about 
270,000 animals were preemptively culled. Destroying so many (healthy) ani-
mals caused the public opinion to demand the adoption of alternative control 
strategies. The Dutch contingency plan for FMD therefore now specifies the use 
of vaccination or marker vaccination in a radius of 2km around a source herd 
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(Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food quality, 2005). While it was necessary 
to cull the vaccinated animals in 2001, this is no longer necessary in future out-
breaks in which animals are vaccinated. Vaccination, however, is expected to be 
less effective than preemptive culling and to increase the number of minor (i.e. 
not detected) farm outbreaks during the epidemic. For the latter reason vacci-
nated farms need to be more thoroughly screened at the end of the epidemic to 
substantiate freedom of infection before export trading can resume. The EU re-
quires that all animals on all vaccinated farms, are serologically tested, while for 
unvaccinated animals only a sample of the sheep suffices. 
 The Dutch contingency plan as well as the EU-screening regulations for vac-
cinated animals does not make a distinction between animal species or farm 
sectors. However, virus transmission and the effect of vaccination differ consid-
erably between species. Cattle are highly susceptible to infection, and they can 
become carriers of the disease, Infected sheep can also become carriers and 
show little clinical symptoms, even when they are unvaccinated. Infected pigs 
excrete large amounts of virus, but they are not easily infected. Vaccination 
does not work as effectively on them as on cattle or sheep. Furthermore, the 
socio-economic impact of an FMD epidemic can vary for different farm sectors. 
Dairy, veal and pig farmers will most probably encounter difficulties in marketing 
products of vaccinated animals, once the epidemic is under control. Hobby 
farmers (i.e. small herds held for recreational purposes) on the other hand are 
largely unknown due to incomplete registration, but the social impact of the 
control measures such as culling in case of an epidemic can be considerable 
here as well. 
 A control strategy might be feasible that is cost-effective, while minimising 
the impact on animal welfare and society. Also for the end-screening strategy it 
is of paramount importance to minimise the risk of missing infected animals 
without wasting screening capacity. Understanding the role of different species 
and farm sectors in the epidemic is of key importance for the design of both 
control and end-screening strategies. 
 
Problem statement 
Since vaccination against FMD in case of an outbreak in which the animals are 
not culled after vaccination is relatively new for the Dutch situation, insight is 
needed into the epidemiological and economic consequences of such a  
strategy.  
 
38 
Research questions 
To evaluate the effectiveness of control strategies different control strategies 
were evaluated. Therefore the following questions were addressed: 
1. What is the optimal control strategy in case of an outbreak of FMD from an 
epidemiological and economic perspective? Evaluated are the control strat-
egy as required by the EU, culling within a 1-km ring, and vaccination within 
2 or 5-km rings around detected farms. 
2. What are the consequences of alternative strategies? 
a. excluding pigs from vaccination; 
b. excluding animals on hobby farms from preemptive culling. 
3. What are the consequences for screening and declaring freedom of infection 
when different control strategies that include vaccination are applied? 
4. What is the distribution of costs between animal species and cost types? 
5. What is the lost value of products of vaccinated animals? 
 
The outline of the rest of the report 
In this report we will evaluate the effectiveness of control strategies that differ-
entiate between species and sectors. In particular, we will examine the control 
strategy as required by the EU as well as control strategies involving additional 
measures (preemptive culling within a 1-km radius and vaccination within a 2 
and 5-km radius) and compare them to alternative strategies that exclude hobby 
farms from preemptive culling, or pig farms from vaccination. For this purpose 
a mathematical model has been developed that takes the differences between 
species (cattle, sheep and pigs) and between sectors (commercial or recrea-
tional) into account. With this model, epidemics are simulated applying one of 
the control strategies under consideration. The results of these hypothetical epi-
demics give an idea of the relative effectiveness and the proportion of minor 
outbreaks for each control strategy. Based on these results the epidemiological 
consequences of the different control strategies are calculated. Both the epi-
demiologic model development and results are described in chapter 2. 
 In chapter 3, the epidemic results are used as input for the end screening. In 
accordance with EU legislation, we model that all vaccinated animals are sero-
logically tested. With this screening model the probability of missing infected 
animals during the end screening is calculated. Missing infected animals poses 
a risk to new outbreaks and to the export position of the country. Two alterna-
tive screening strategies are also evaluated: (1) a less stringent strategy in 
which a smaller number of the vaccinated pigs are sampled and (2) a more 
stringent strategy in which also non-vaccinated cattle and pigs are sampled. 
Comparing the outcomes of the different end-screening strategies gives an idea 
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of the expected risk of missing infected animals after an FMD epidemic and the 
required sampling effort. 
 In chapter 4 an economic evaluation of the different control strategies is 
made based on the results of the simulated epidemics. With a Partial Budget 
model the economic consequences of the strategies are compared and the 
economic impact for the different species and sectors is evaluated. 
 Chapter 5 finalises this report with discussion and conclusions. 
 
40 
2 Epidemiology of Foot-and-Mouth 
Disease 
 
 
Authors: Jantien Backer, Thomas Hagenaars, Gonnie Nodelijk, Herman van 
Roermund 
 
 
2.1 Introduction: epidemiology 
 
In this chapter we develop and apply a mathematical model that captures the 
key differences in the epidemiology of the different animal species and farm 
sectors. It consists of two modules that describe the within-herd and between-
herd transmission dynamics of FMD, as shown schematically in figure 2.1. For 
the within-herd model that is formulated in terms of individual animals, parame-
ters are estimated for each species from literature on transmission and vaccina-
tion experiments. In the between-herd model the farm itself is the smallest unit. 
The transmission at this level is modelled by distant-dependent probabilities, 
calibrated by the outbreak data of 2001 in the Netherlands (virus strain 
O/Net/2001). Information on interspecies transmission at this scale or relative 
importance is not available and must be estimated from other available sources. 
To apply the model to the 2006 farm density situation, it needs the locations 
and type of all farms in the Netherlands, which are available in databases. The 
within-herd module simulates a farm outbreak and sends the profile of the infec-
tion pressure (i.e. number of infectious animals as a function of time) to the be-
tween-herd module that determines which herds are infected by the source 
herd. The within-herd module also sends the detection time of the within-herd 
outbreak (if applicable), at which the between-herd module determines which 
herds need to be culled or vaccinated, depending on the control strategy. This 
information on infection, vaccination and culling times is sent back to the within-
herd module that simulates the outbreak on the next infected farm. The result -
after the last infected farm-outbreak is simulated - is the total course of the hy-
pothetical epidemic. This model structure allows for the extrapolation of the ef-
fects of vaccinating individual animals to the level of an area with many farms. 
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Figure 2.1 Schematic representation of two-level transmission model 
for FMD 
within-herd 
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2.2 Within-herd model 
 
The within-herd transmission of FMD between animals can be described by a 
simple SEIR model: when a susceptible (S) animal is infected, it will be exposed 
(E) for a latent period, after which it becomes infectious (I) to other animals, until 
it stops shedding virus and is removed (R) from the infection process. The rate 
of infection rinf at time t is expressed as: 
 
N
tItStttr vac
)()()()(inf ?? ??
  
[2.1] 
 
where ? is the transmission rate, ? the relative susceptibility (depending on the 
time since vaccination tvac) and S, I and N denote the number of susceptible, in-
fectious and all animals. As the number N of animals in a farm can be small, it is 
important to take variation occurring due to chance into account. Therefore, we 
consider a stochastic infection process with the rate given by Eq. 2.1. This is 
implemented numerically by giving each animal an individual infection threshold 
(Sellke, 1983). The latent and infectious periods are both modelled by a gamma 
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distribution, making the model non-Markovian (i.e. each individual animal and its 
history needs to be modelled separately). 
 Parallel to the course of the FMD infection, are the clinical symptoms asso-
ciated with it, such as lameness and vesicles on tongue and feet. An infected 
animal will show clinical symptoms after an incubation period, until it recovers. 
This is described by a model for clinical disease that determines whether and 
when an infected animal will show clinical symptoms. Both the incubation and 
clinical period are modelled by a gamma distribution. 
 The durations of all these periods (latent, infectious, incubation, clinical) for 
cattle, sheep/goats and pigs can be estimated from experiments with the dif-
ferent animal types, as well as the effect of vaccination on the susceptibility of 
animals. Data of the 2001 epidemic in the Netherlands provide information on 
the reproduction number within an infected herd and on the time between infec-
tion and (clinical) detection of the herd. 
 Below, the estimations for the parameters are discussed for the three ani-
mal types: cattle, pigs and sheep. For goats data were hardly available, and 
goats and goat farms were included as if sheep and sheep farms. In the model 
all periods (latent, infectious, incubation, clinical) are modelled by a gamma dis-
tribution, of which the 95% interval is denoted between brackets. They are 
summarised in table 2.1. The course of infection within the infected individuals 
and the build-up of protection for vaccinated individuals are shown in figure 2.2. 
 
2.2.1 Latent period 
 
The time between infection and becoming infectious is very short for FMD. 
We choose 2 (1.0-3.3) days for cattle (Orsel et al., 2007) and sheep/goats  
(Alexandersen et al., 2002; Gibson and Donaldson 1986). The latent period for 
pigs is even shorter: 1 (0.50-1.7) day (Eblé et al., 2004). 
 
2.2.2 Infectious period 
 
In the model the infectious periods represent only the acute stage of the infec-
tion; carriers (which for FMD occur in cattle only) with a long infectious period 
and low virus excretion are not modelled as they do not contribute to a within-
herd outbreak (Moonen et al., 2004). By assuming short infectious periods, all 
secondary infections are concentrated during the first, highly infectious period 
of an infected animal. We choose 4 (2.0-6.7) days for both cattle (Orsel et al., 
2007) and pigs (Eblé et al., 2004; Orsel et al., 2007c), whereas sheep and 
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goats have a longer (highly) infectious period of 7 (5.0-9.3) days (Alexandersen 
et al., 2002; McVicar and Sutmolle, 1972). 
 
2.2.3 Clinical disease 
 
The reported incubation periods for FMD range from 2 to 14 days (Kitching, 
2002; Kitching and Hughes, 2002; Kitching and Alexandersen, 2002), depending 
on challenge dose, virus strain and susceptibility. Based on experimental results, 
we assume a narrower incubation period of 5 (3.0-7.5) days for both cattle (Cox 
et al., 2005) and sheep/goats (Gibson and Donaldson, 1986; Orsel et al., 2007b). 
Pigs are assumed to show clinical signs a day earlier (i.e. 4 (2.0-6.7) days after in-
fection), as they also become infectious a day earlier. In experimental settings 
25% of the infected sheep and goats do not show any clinical signs (Kitching and 
Hughes, 2002; Orsel et al., 2007b), but in the field this percentage is expected to 
be higher, as these animals are not as well observed or examined by the farmer. 
Therefore, we assume subclinical infection for 50% of the infected sheep. All (un-
vaccinated) infected cattle and pigs will show clinical signs. 
 The animals recover in 1 or 2 weeks after the onset of the symptoms (web-
site OIE), so the clinical period for all animal types is modelled as a broad 
gamma distribution around the average of 10.5 (7.0-14.7) days. This choice is 
not very relevant for unvaccinated cattle and pigs as most of the within-herd 
outbreaks are already detected before animals start to recover. Vaccinated 
animals (see paragraph 2.2.d) and unvaccinated sheep/goats however, may re-
cover without the disease ever being noticed by the farmer or practitioner. 
 
2.2.4 Vaccination 
 
Vaccination reduces the susceptibility of vaccinated non-infected animals and 
when they are infected - it reduces the infectious period and the infectiousness. 
For Classical Swine Fever the effect of vaccination on these three parameters 
could be estimated (Backer et al., 2008). For FMD this was not possible as the 
available vaccination transmission experiments were less detailed. Therefore, 
we only model the decrease of susceptibility of non-infected animals as a func-
tion of the time since vaccination. So, when a vaccinated animal does get in-
fected it will excrete virus as much and as long as if it were unvaccinated. The 
decrease in susceptibility is chosen so that it describes the results observed in 
transmission experiments. In this way the full effect of vaccination is described 
by the decrease in susceptibility alone. 
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 Many vaccination-challenge and vaccination-transmission experiments have 
shown that vaccinated cattle (Orsel et al., 2007; Cox et al., 2005; Orsel et al., 
2005; Doel et al., 1994; Golde et al., 2005), sheep (Orsel et al., 2007b) and 
pigs (Eblé et al., 2004; Eblé et al., 2008; Salt et al., 1998) are protected 
against infection from 14 days post vaccination onwards. Experiments with a 
shorter vaccination-challenge period of 7 days are less common and indicate 
that cattle (Doel et al., 1994; Golde et al., 2005) and sheep (Cox et al., 1999) 
are already fully protected against infection, but in those experiments the chal-
lenge and vaccination strains were identical. Therefore, a more conservative 
choice for immunity is appropriate. In the model the susceptibility decreases 
linearly from 1 at 4 dpv (days post vaccination) to 0 at 11 dpv for cattle and 
sheep/goats. Pigs are not protected against infection after a vaccination-
challenge period of 7 days (Eblé et al., 2004). For pigs the susceptibility starts 
decreasing three days later than for cattle: from 1 at 7 dpv, until 0 at 14 dpv. 
Although vaccinated pigs can even be infected by unvaccinated seeders after 
14 dpv (Orsel et al., 2007c), it is assumed that this situation will not occur when 
all animal transports are prohibited (after HRP) and that earlier infected vacci-
nated animals will not be sufficiently infectious to maintain the epidemic (be-
cause of pen barriers that prevent direct contact). Recent experiments by Van 
Roermund et al. (in preparation) indeed showed that between-pen transmission 
of vaccinated pigs (14 dpv) is too low for a within-herd outbreak to occur. 
 Vaccination also protects infected animals against clinical disease. We as-
sume this protection mirrors the susceptibility for cattle and sheep/goats, start-
ing at 4 dpv and linearly increasing to full protection at 11 dpv. Remember that 
only 50% of the infected unvaccinated sheep and goats show clinical disease. 
Pigs only achieve a maximum of 50% protection against clinical disease (Orsel 
et al., 2007c). The protection against clinical disease is an important aspect of 
the model, as the detection of an infected farm is based on the number of ob-
served clinical cases. When this number does not exceed a certain detection 
limit, the outbreak will die out unnoticed, affecting only a small number of ani-
mals that need to be detected during the end screening. 
 
2.2.5 Reproduction of FMD within a herd 
 
For the virus transmission within a herd, we can use the results of transmission 
experiments and the clinical and laboratory reports of real outbreaks. 
 Transmission experiments provide information on the spread of the infection 
through a relatively small population. They can often only determine whether the 
reproduction number R0 is significantly above unity. Moreover, in experiments all 
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animals are in direct contact, which is not true for most farm situations. On the 
other hand, real outbreaks are often less well documented. Usually the herd 
prevalence is known at the time of detection and the time of infection of the 
farm is estimated. Here, we use clinical reports and estimated infection dates of 
a number of cattle herds that were infected during the 2001 epidemic in the 
Netherlands and literature findings, to estimate the reproduction number for 
each animal type. 
 From the Dutch 2001 outbreak we obtained 21 data points for cattle farms. 
A reproduction number of 6 seems to fit the data reasonably well (see figure 
2.3). Estimating the best fit is probably too rigorous for these data, due to the 
lack of data points and because the infection dates are only rough estimates. 
Moreover, the period when the virus survives outside the host is not taken into 
account. For pigs we assume an identical reproduction number of 6. This is 
much lower than found in transmission experiments (Eblé et al., 2008), but the 
clustering in pens and stables will most probably lower the overall reproduction 
number within a pig herd (Eblé et al., 2006). Virus transmission amongst sheep 
is observed to be very gradual, indicating a reproduction number just above 
unity; in the model it is assumed to be 1.5, agreeing with the value of 1.1 re-
ported by Orsel et al. (2007b). 
 The reproduction rate is the reproduction number divided by the average in-
fectious period. 
 
2.2.6 Clinical detection 
 
The detection of infection during the epidemic is based on the number of clinical 
cases that a visiting practitioner notices. The detection threshold of clinical 
cases in the model is set to 3 cases for cattle, 6 for sheep and goats and 7 for 
pigs, all derived from the estimated period between infection and suspicion. The 
first (3 clinical cases for cattle) corresponds to an average period between in-
fection and suspicion of 8 days, as was observed in the 2001 outbreak in the 
Netherlands. For sheep this type of information is lacking, and we assume a 
double detection limit, i.e. 6 clinical cases. Due to the higher detection limit, the 
high percentage of subclinical disease and the smaller reproduction number in 
sheep, it may take a considerable period of time before suspicion arises, typi-
cally around three weeks. 
 For pigs we assume that clinical detection will on average take place a day 
earlier than for cattle (as the latent period is one day shorter), resulting in a de-
tection time of 7 days and a corresponding detection limit of 7 clinical cases. 
The detection limit for sheep on a hobby farm is set to 3 clinical cases (instead 
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of 6 clinical cases on a commercial sheep farm), because hobby farms consist 
of fewer animals. 
 These detection limits are fixed, ensuring that the detection time can vary. 
One day after the suspicion the disease is confirmed and the farm culled. 
To illustrate the within-herd model, outbreaks are simulated at different infection-
vaccination intervals for three model farms that consist of 100 cattle, 100 
sheep and 1,000 pigs. The results of these simulations, including the fraction of 
detected outbreaks, the detection time and the number of affected animals at 
the end of a detected or undetected outbreak, are described in detail in Appen-
dix 1. 
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Table 2.1 FMD parameters for within-herd model 
Parameter Cattle Sheep/goats Pigs 
latent period (days) 2 (1.0-3.3) 2 (1.0-3.3) 1 (0.50-1.7) 
infectious period (days) 4 (2.0-6.7) 7 (5.0-9.3) 4 (2.0-6.7) 
clinical disease 
onset (dpi) 
duration (days) 
subclinical (%) 
5 (3.0-7.5)
10.5 (7.0-14.7)
0%
5 (3.0-7.5)
10.5 (7.0-14.7)
50%
 
4 (2.0-6.7) 
10.5 (7.0-14.7) 
0 
vaccination 
- protection against infection: 
 onset (dpv) 
 full protection (dpv) 
- protection against  
- clinical disease: 
 onset (dpv) 
 full protection (dpv) 
4
11
4
11
4
11
4
11
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7 
14 (max. 50%) 
reproduction within a herd 
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0.21
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1.5 
Clinical detection of infected 
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Figure 2.3 Clinical cases as a function of days post infection (dpi), ob-
served in the 2001 outbreak for 21 farms (large dots) and 
simulated with R0=6 (solid line with shaded 95% interval) for 
cattle farms 
Number of clinical cases 
dpi 
 
 
2.3 Between-herd model 
 
The transmission between herds depends on the distance between source and 
destination herd, the infection pressure generated at source herd and the type 
of animals at source and destination herd. The hazard ?ij at time t that an infec-
tious farm i infects a susceptible farm j at that time, is described by: 
 
)()()( tqrkSIt iijjiij ??  [2.2] 
 
where Ii is the relative infectivity of the infectious farm, Sj the relative susceptibil-
ity of the susceptible farm, qi the time-dependent infection pressure at the infec-
tious farm and k(rij) the transmission kernel that depends on the distance rij 
between farms i and j. The probability that a farm i will infect farm j during its 
entire infectious period Ti is: 
 
0
1 exp ( ) ( )i
T
ij i j ij ip I S k r q t dt? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? . [2.3] 
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 This formulation describes a heterogeneous model that relates the trans-
mission probability to distance between farms (via k(rij)), that allows a varying in-
fection pressure (via qi(t)) and infectious period (via Ti) per infectious herd, and 
that discerns different herd types (via Ii and Sj). Herd-size differences within a 
herd type are directly related to the infection pressure, while differences be-
tween herd types are captured in the relative infectivity and susceptibility. Below 
we will discuss the separate elements of Eq. 2.3 in more detail. 
 
2.3.1 Transmission kernel 
 
The transmission kernel follows a power law relation: 
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where the parameters k0, r0 and ? determine the height and the shape of the 
transmission kernel. These were estimated for the 2001 FMD epidemic in the 
Netherlands in a previous project (virus strain O/NET/2001, Boender et al., 
2006), assuming all farms are equal (no distinction between farm types,  
i.e. Ii = 1 ? i and Sj = 1 ? j) and all infectious farms generate a fixed infection 
pressure (qi = 1 day-1 ? i) for a fixed infectious period (Ti = 7 days ? i). This re-
sulted in r0 = 0.9km, ? = 2.3, and k0 = 0.0019 day-1 (see figure 2.4). 
 We will use the estimations for the shape parameters r0 and ? in our model; 
the height of the kernel k0 however depends on the heterogeneous properties of 
the transmission and will therefore be estimated for the new model in section 
2.3.3. 
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Figure 2.4 Between-herd transmission kernel: probability of infection 
during the entire infectious period as a function of distance 
between source and destination herd (Eq. 2.4) 
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2.3.2 Infection pressure 
 
A within-herd simulation for an infected herd provides the infection pressure as a 
function of time, which is proportional to the number of infectious animals at 
that time. When an outbreak on a farm affects a large number of animals, it will 
present a large infectivity to other herds. In this way, the difference between 
large and small farms (of the same herd type!) is captured, because large farms 
can host potentially larger outbreaks. 
 The infection pressure is normalised for each herd type (cattle, sheep, pigs 
and hobby farms) and multiplied by the fixed total infection pressure of 7 that 
was used for the kernel estimation. Using the same average total infection 
pressure means that the probabilities pij in Eq. 2.3 are on average also the 
same as during the kernel estimation (assuming that the exponential argument 
in Eq. 2.3 is much smaller than unity so that xe x ?? ?1  applies), which allows 
for the use of the same kernel (shape) parameters. 
 
 
2.3.3 Heterogeneous transmission 
 
For the transmission kernel estimation the relative infectivity and susceptibility 
for all farm types were chosen to be unity (Boender et al., 2006). This means 
for instance that a susceptible hobby farm and a susceptible cattle farm have an 
equal chance to be infected by a source herd (at the same between-herd dis-
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tance). We can use the observations from the 2001 epidemic to determine the 
probability of this 'homogeneous transmission assumption'. During this epidemic 
(with virus strain O/NET/2001) only cattle farms were infected, or - in other 
words - all sheep, pigs and hobby farms escaped infection despite the infection 
pressure posed by the infectious cattle farms. The probability that this would 
occur can be calculated with the estimated infection and removal dates of in-
fected herds, the location data of all herds and the estimated parameters for 
the transmission kernel (Eq. 2.4). When all farms are equally susceptible the 
probability that none of the sheep farms is infected is 0.005, that none of the 
pig farms is infected is 0.09 and that none of the hobby farms is infected is 
1·10-5. This is a strong indication that the equal susceptibility assumption 
should be rejected, at least for sheep and hobby farms. A similar check for the 
equal infectivity assumption is not possible, as only cattle herds were infected. 
 Relative transmission properties for different herd types have been esti-
mated for the 2001 UK epidemic in two studies. Ferguson et al. (2001) classi-
fied the herd type by the most affluent species present on the farm, regardless 
of the species infected. Chis Ster et al. (2007) assume the infectivity and sus-
ceptibility of a farm to be directly proportional to the number of animals present, 
which is explicitly not assumed in our model. These different model assumptions 
and differences in herd size and contact structure makes a direct adoption of 
their estimated transmission properties invalid. Instead, we will use a combina-
tion of experimental results, literature and expert opinion to derive best guesses 
for the relative infectivity and susceptibility for each herd type. We will consider 
four herd types: cattle, sheep, pig and hobby farms. This means that different 
commercial herd types of the same species (such as dairy and beef cattle) are 
identical in the model. 
 To assess the relative infectivity of each herd type, we need to consider the 
amount of virus present on an infected farm and the various ways for a virus 
particle to leave an infected farm. The amount of virus present on an infected 
farm depends on the virus excretion per animal and the number of infectious 
animals. Infected cattle and sheep excrete similar quantities of virus (Alexander-
sen et al., 2002), while aerosol production for pigs can be 100 times as high 
(Kitching and Alexandersen, 2002). Figure A1.2 shows that the number of af-
fected animals on pig farms is 4 to 5 times higher than on sheep or cattle 
farms. The number of affected animals on hobby farms is lower than on com-
mercial sheep farms, due to their limited size. For the virus transmission from 
an infected farm, we can consider airborne spread and spread via contacts. The 
role of airborne spread is closely related to the housing of the animals; cattle 
and sheep generally graze on pastures that might border neighbouring prem-
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ises, while pigs are kept in closed buildings, which may also constrain virus par-
ticles. The transmission via contacts depends on the contact frequency with 
animals, vehicles and people. The transports of live animals can be neglected 
for this model, because it is only valid for the epidemic time after the HRP. Cat-
tle (especially on dairy farms) are probably more intensively handled than pigs 
or sheep, and the frequency of contacts is expected to be lowest for hobby 
farms. We choose cattle farms as a reference (with a relative infectivity of unity) 
and based on the considerations above, the relative infectivity of sheep farms 
as 0.5, of pig farms as 10 and of hobby farms as 0.1. 
 To assess the relative susceptibility of each herd type, we need to consider 
the amount of virus needed to infect at least one animal on a farm and the vari-
ous ways in which a virus particle can arrive at a non-infected farm. Based on 
the minimal infection dose and the respiratory volume of an animal, Donaldson 
et al. (2001) estimated the minimum concentration of virus particles in air to in-
fect an animal. His results suggest that cattle are 10 times more susceptible for 
airborne infection than sheep and at least 200 times more susceptible than 
pigs. The susceptibility of an entire farm also depends on the number of animals 
at risk, i.e. the herd size. Pig farms are on average 10 times larger than cattle 
or sheep farms, but due to the low susceptibility per pig it is expected that pig 
farms have a lower susceptibility. Hobby farms are the smallest in size and 
therefore expected to be less susceptible. Concerning the different transmis-
sion routes, the same considerations apply as described above: closed housing 
could protect pigs against infection through airborne spread, handling and con-
tact frequencies are expected to be highest for cattle farms, et cetera. We 
choose cattle farms as a reference (with a relative susceptibility of unity) and 
based on the considerations above, the relative susceptibility of sheep farms as 
0.5, of pig farms as 0.1 and of hobby farms as 0.1. 
 The left-hand side of figure 2.5 shows a matrix with the estimated relative 
transmission properties and their multiplication. This assumes random mixing of 
the interherd contacts. However, Chis Ster et al. (2007) showed that it is more 
probable that cattle and sheep farms have more within-species contacts than 
between-species contacts (assortative mixing). Although their model is not di-
rectly comparable to ours, we will adopt their degree of mixing (an assortative 
mixing factor of 2) for the commercial farms. Contacts with hobby farms mix 
randomly; professional contacts are assumed to be less common in this group. 
The right-hand side of figure 2.5 shows the resulting transmission matrix. 
 Finally, we need to relate the kernel height k0 for heterogeneous transmis-
sion to the outbreak data of 2001. The average reproduction ratio between 
herds Rh was estimated to be 1.25 with the homogeneous transmission kernel. 
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By multiplying the original kernel height with a correction factor of 1.15, the 
same average reproduction ratio is reproduced. 
 
Figure 2.5 Transmission matrix for each herd type a)  
   infectious farm          
   cattle sheep pigs hobby  assortative mixing    infectious farm 
  1 0.5 10 0.1         cattle sheep pigs hobby 
cattle 1 1 0.5 10 0.1  2 1 1 1  cattle 2 0.5 10 0.1 
sheep 0.5 0.5 0.25 5 0.05 x 1 2 1 1 = sheep 0.5 0.5 5 0.05 
pigs 0.1 0.1 0.05 1 0.01  1 1 2 1  pigs 0.1 0.05 2 0.01 
su
sc
ep
tib
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rm
 
hobby 0.1 0.1 0.05 1 0.01  1 1 1 1  s
us
ce
pt
ib
le
 fa
rm
 
hobby 0.1 0.05 1 0.01 
 
a) The relative susceptibility and infectivity (during its entire infectious period) for each herd type are shown in gray; 
their multiplication (left) is multiplied by an assortative mixing matrix (middle), resulting in the overall transmission 
matrix (right). 
 
 
2.4 Farm data 
 
Two databases containing farm data are available (one from the Ministry of LNV 
and another for pig farms only from the Animal Health Service (GD)). The I&R da-
tabase of LNV contains 92,333 records with farm location and the number of 
cattle, sheep, goats and pigs present in August 2007. As the information on 
pigs in this database is incomplete, the other database is used that solely con-
tains pig farm data. This GD database contains 16,412 records with farm loca-
tion and the number of finishers, gilts and sows plus boars present in 2005. The 
number of piglets on a farm is not given, but can be estimated from the number 
of sows present. Assuming a sow produces 2.4 litters per year of 10.5 piglets 
on average, and the piglets stay on the multiplier farm for 9 weeks, the number 
of piglets is calculated as 2.4·10.5·63/365 = 4.3 times the number of sows. 
As the records in both databases also contain 'empty' and 'historic' holdings, we 
need extra information to select the 'active' farms. We will match the databases 
to the number of commercial farms in 2006, as reported in the Land- en tuin-
bouwcijfers 2007 survey, and to an estimation of the number of hobby farms. 
We will not make a distinction between different commercial herd types of the 
same species; a cattle farm can consist of dairy cattle or beef cattle and a pig 
farm can be a finishing or multiplier farm, et cetera. 
 The agricultural survey (Land- en tuinbouwcijfers 2007) reports all holdings 
with a minimum size of 3 nge ('Nederlandse grootte-eenheid', measure of the 
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economic value of agricultural activities, see table 2.2). Although the smaller 
farms are too small to be economically profitable, we will consider all farms re-
ported in the agricultural survey as commercial, because small animal sections 
can be part of a larger holding (that will be considered commercial). From an 
epidemiological point of view, the most important parameter is the number of 
farms (and thus the relative farm densities). That is why the number of farms in 
the two databases are matched to the number of farms in the survey data, by 
omitting the farms that are smallest in size. The resulting lower limits for the 
farm size are 5 for cattle, 11 for sheep/goats and 190 for pigs. Comparing the 
average farm size and the total number of animals (table 2.2), the survey and 
model farms are also in agreement. Farms that are less than 20 meters apart, 
are considered to be mixed holdings. 
 A survey of the hobby farm sector is less straightforward. The definition of a 
hobby farm is not always clear and not all hobby farms are reported, but the ex-
tent of underreporting is unknown. Treep et al. (2004) use an economic point of 
view that a hobby farm is by definition not for profit. They estimate 15,000-
30,000 hobby sheep farms with in total 450,000 sheep and 10,000-20,000 
hobby goat farms with in total 112,000 goats. However, in times of an epidemic 
crisis, the definition of a hobby farm will most probably be based on its con-
tacts. For instance, when a not-for-profit farm is part of a larger commercial 
holding or is embedded in professional contact structures, it is more likely to be 
treated as a commercial holding. Therefore, we choose the number of hobby 
farms lower than the hobby farm survey: 20,000 hobby sheep farms with 
10 sheep each, so 200,000 hobby sheep in total. These hobby farms are never 
part of a mixed holding for the reasons above. Other types of hobby farms (cat-
tle, pigs) are less common and not taken into account in the model. For the lo-
cations of the hobby sheep farms, we use 17,711 locations of the small sheep 
and goats farms in the I&R database (from 1 to 10 sheep/goats per farm), that 
were not used for the commercial holdings. For the remaining 2,289 farm loca-
tions (to add up to 20,000) we use empty holdings where sheep and/or goats 
can be held. This group of farms is randomly scattered over the Netherlands. 
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Table 2.2 Farm data for 2006 in the Netherlands, as taken from 
the agricultural survey (LEI Wageningen UR and Statistics 
Netherlands, 2007) and as used in the model 
 Agricultural survey Model 
 cattle a) cattle c) 
number of farms 
average farm size (min-max) 
total number of animals (x 1,000) 
36,246
103
3,745
36,567 
101 (5-3,229) 
3 695 
 sheep/goats a) sheep/goats c) 
number of farms 
average farm size (min-max) 
total number of animals (x 1,000) 
18,305
92
1,686
18,648 
78 (11-4,781) 
1,456 
 pigs a) pigs d) 
number of farms 
average farm size (min-max) 
total number of animals (x 1,000) 
9,041
1,256
11,356
9,021 
1,228 (190-35,366) 
11,075 
 hobby b) hobby e) 
number of farms 
average farm size (min-max) 
total number of animals (x 1,000) 
25,000-50,000
11-22
562
20,000 
10 (10-10) 
200 
a) Land- en tuinbouwcijfers (2007); b) Treep et al. (2004); c) I&R database (LNV, August 2007); d) GD database 
(2005); e) Estimation (see text). 
 
 Livestock farms are not evenly distributed over the Netherlands, which is 
also reflected by the farms used in the model (see figure 2.6). 
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Figure 2.6 Farm densities in the model for (a) cattle, (b) sheep, (c) pigs 
and (d) hobby farms; 0 (grey), 0-1 (green), 1-2 (yellow),  
2-3 (orange), 3-4 (red) and >4 (purple) farms/km2 
 
(a) cattle (b) sheep 
  
(c) pigs (d) hobby 
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2.5 Control strategies 
 
The model described in sections 2.2 and 2.3 is applied to the farm structure of 
2006 in the Netherlands (section 2.4) to compare different control strategies 
(see table 2.3). The minimal control strategy (min) consists of the EU-required 
measures of culling detected infection sources, regulating transport and tracing 
dangerous contacts. The delay between confirmation of the infection and culling 
of the detected farm is assumed to be one day throughout the epidemic. Often 
additional control measures are required to curb the epidemic. Here we will 
study preemptive ring culling and ring vaccination in various conformations. 
 Preemptive ring culling is always applied within a radius of 1km around a de-
tected infection source, and is applied either to all farms (cul1) or only to com-
mercial farms (cul1h). In the first week after the first detection the delay 
between culling the infection source and preemptive culling of the neighbouring 
farms is one day, but it increases to two days after the first week to account for 
potentially limited culling capacity. Ring vaccination strategies cannot be applied 
instantaneously following the first detection, but permission needs to be ob-
tained from the EU first. We assume this takes 7 days, in which period the start-
ing epidemic is controlled by preemptive ring culling within 1-km radius with a 
1 day delay between culling of the infection source and neighbouring farms. Af-
ter the first week the delay between culling of the infection source and vaccina-
tion of the neighbouring farms is also one day, regardless of the vaccination 
radius. Two control strategies apply ring vaccination to all farms, i.e. within 2-
km and 5-km radius around a detected source farm (vac2 and vac5). For DPLAs 
the 5-km ring vaccination strategy will in practice be comparable to area-wide 
vaccination. Two alternative vaccination strategies make a distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial farms, by excluding hobby farms from preemp-
tive culling in the week after the first detection (vac2h and vac5h), after which 
they are vaccinated like the commercial farms. Similarly, in two alternative vac-
cination strategies pig farms are excluded from vaccination (vac2p and vac5p), 
but not from preemptive culling in the first week. In total nine control strategies 
are evaluated. Table 2.3 summarises them and shows their abbreviations. 
 
59 
Table 2.3 Different evaluated control strategies 
Abbreviation Control strategy 
min EU measures, no additional measures 
cul1 1-km preemptive ring culling 
cul1h 1-km preemptive ring culling, except hobby farms 
vac2 2-km ring vaccination 
vac2h 2-km ring vaccination, no culling of hobby farms in 1st week 
vac2p 2-km ring vaccination except pig farms 
vac5 5-km ring vaccination 
vac5h 5-km ring vaccination, no culling of hobby farms in 1st week 
 
 For each control strategy the initial state is identical, i.e. the number of in-
fected farms and their locations at the time of the first detection. To construct 
such an initial state, we use the model described in sections 2.2 and 2.3, even 
though it is only valid in the period after the first detection. One farm (either a 
cattle or pig farm) is randomly picked as infection source that with a high hypo-
thetical infection pressure transmits the infection to ten other farms during 
14 days. These second-generation farms can in their turn infect other farms. 
The situation at the moment the first farm is detected, is used as initial state for 
simulating the different control scenarios. Four 'worst case' scenarios are cho-
sen to start the epidemic in a densely populated livestock area (DPLA) with ei-
ther many pig farms (as in Noord-Brabant), many cattle farms (as in Oost-
Nederland) or both (as in the Gelderse Vallei). As a comparison also a sparsely 
populated livestock area is chosen in Friesland, where the infection will start on 
a cattle farm that infects five other farms (instead of ten). Table 2.4 summarises 
the different scenarios and figure 2.7 shows the different areas. 
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Table 2.4 Simulated scenarios in different areas with different infection 
source 
 Farm density  
(farms/km2) 
 commercial 
holdings 
hobby  
farms 
Infection  
source 
Number of farms  
infected by source  
farm (during HRP) 
Gelderse Vallei  a) 4.3 0.94 cattle farm 10 
Gelderse Vallei  a) 4.3 0.94 pig farm 10 
Noord-Brabant  a) 3.0 0.99 pig farm 10 
Oost-Nederland  a) 2.9 0.92 cattle farm 10 
Friesland  b) 2.2 0.76 cattle farm 5 
a) Densely populated livestock area; b) Sparsely populated livestock area. 
 
 Finally, the different control strategies are also evaluated with a homogene-
ous transmission kernel (only for the Gelderse Vallei with a cattle farm as infec-
tion source). This means that all infected farms (cattle, pigs and sheep/goats) 
are on average equally infectious, and all non-infected farms are equally suscep-
tible (in other words, all terms in figure 2.5 are unity). Although this is not a real-
istic scenario, it serves to assess the effect of the assumptions made for the 
heterogeneous transmission model. 
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Figure 2.7 Different areas for initialisation of the simulated epidemics, 
starting on (a) a cattle farm or (b) a pig farm 
 
(a) cattle (b) pigs 
 
  
2.6 Results and discussion: epidemiology of FMD 
 
For each control strategy and starting situation, 1,000 hypothetical epidemics 
are simulated. Each realisation can be characterised by the duration of the epi-
demic, the number of infected farms (that are either detected, not detected or 
preemptively culled) and the number of preemptively culled and/or vaccinated 
farms. These characteristics are summarised in table 2.5 for the heterogeneous 
transmission model and in table 2.6 the composition of infected and not de-
tected farms (before the end screening) is given. Below, the results and the 
course of the epidemics are discussed in more detail. 
 
2.6.1 Results for the minimal control strategy 
 
The minimal control strategy (min) comprises culling of detected infection 
sources, set up of transport regulations and tracing of dangerous contacts. No 
additional measures regarding the neighbouring farms of detected infected 
herds are taken. In DPLAs this can lead to a severe epidemic lasting up to one 
year and reaching outbreak sizes up to 2,000 farms (table 2.5). The largest 
part of the infected farms comprises cattle farms, even in the pig-dense areas 
Gelderse
Vallei 
Friesland 
Oost- 
Nederland 
Gelderse 
Vallei 
Noord-
Brabant 
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(table 2.6). Around 8% of the infected farms are not detected during the epi-
demic, which are mainly sheep farms (table 2.6). 
 In the Gelderse Vallei the farm densities are higher than in the other two 
DPLAs (Oost-Nederland and Noord-Brabant), leading to a larger median outbreak 
size and duration, and thus a larger epidemic curve (see figure 2.8). In fact, the 
95% epidemic curves of Oost-Nederland and Noord-Brabant in figure 2.8 are 
caused by epidemics that also affect the Gelderse Vallei. When the epidemic 
starts on a pig farm instead of a cattle farm, the peak of the epidemic curve is 
higher and earlier, because of the high infectivity of an infected pig farm and the 
relative ease to infect other pig farms. These differences between the starting 
situations are similar for all control strategies and will not be discussed further 
in the following sections. The results of the minimal control strategy suggest 
that in DPLAs additional control is always required, to curb the epidemic as 
soon as possible. For SPLAs, results are shown and discussed in section 2.6.5. 
 
2.6.2 Results for basic control strategies 
 
The basic control strategies are applied to all farms, regardless of species or 
commercial purposes. They include preemptive ring culling within 1-km radius 
around a detected infection source (cul1) and ring vaccination within 2-km and 
5-km radius (vac2 and vac5). The results in table 2.5 show that the outbreak 
sizes of 1-km culling and 5-km vaccination are comparable, but the outbreak du-
ration is shorter for 5-km vaccination. The 2-km vaccination strategy is less ef-
fective than 1-km culling in terms of both outbreak size and duration. The 
number of preemptively culled farms using the culling strategy is large com-
pared to the outbreak size (around a factor of 20 in the Gelderse Vallei), due to 
the high farm densities. Interestingly, the number of preemptively culled farms is 
comparable to the number of detected and culled farms in the minimal strategy, 
meaning that either strategy will lead to large numbers of culled farms. In the 
vaccination strategies the number of culled farms is much smaller, even though 
large numbers of farms are affected by the control measures (ratio of vacci-
nated farms and outbreak size is 30 for 2-km vaccination and 100 for 5-km 
vaccination). Figure 2.9 shows the required culling and vaccination capacities 
for the basic control strategies. In the first week all strategies require a consid-
erable culling capacity of around 10 (0-63) farms to be culled per day. When 
permission for vaccination is obtained, the required culling and vaccination ca-
pacities are highest in the first week of the vaccination campaign (i.e. the sec-
ond week after the first detection): for the 1-km culling strategy 18 (0-83) farms 
need to be culled per day, for the 2-km vaccination strategy 53 (0-237) farms 
63 
need to be vaccinated per day, and for the 5-km vaccination strategy 149 (0-
800) farms need to be vaccinated per day. Table 2.7 specifies these numbers 
for the different types of animals and lists the number of animals to be vacci-
nated per day. From this table it is clear that the largest amounts of animals to 
be vaccinated are pigs. Comparing these outcomes with the estimated available 
vaccination capacity of 120 farms per day or 10,000 animals per day (personal 
communication, Aldo Dekker, Wim Pelgrim), we conclude that the vaccination 
capacity is sufficient for 5-km vaccination for almost 50% of the simulated epi-
demics. When pig farms are excluded from vaccination the vaccination capacity 
is sufficient for larger epidemics and/or larger vaccination circles. 
 The number of infected farms that is not detected during the epidemic (be-
fore the end screening) differs largely: for 1-km culling 4%-7% of the infected 
farms is not detected, while this percentage is 11%-18% for 2-km vaccination 
and 12%-20% for 5-km vaccination (see table 2.6). For the culling strategy these 
undetected farms are mostly sheep farms (just like the minimal strategy), but 
for the vaccination strategies they are mostly (vaccinated) cattle farms. 
 The epidemic curves in figure 2.10 provide insight into the effectiveness of 
the control strategies during the epidemic. The curves are identical for all three 
strategies in the first week, because in this period preemptive culling within a 1-
km circle around detected herds is applied. From day 7 onwards, the epidemic 
curves diverge: for the culling strategy the curve is already decreasing, while for 
the vaccination strategies they start to increase again, as vaccination needs 
more time to take effect. The peak of the epidemic curves indicates the time at 
which the between-herd reproduction number is lowered below unity, while at 
the start of the epidemic the between-herd reproduction number is above unity. 
Figure 2.10 shows that for at least 50% of the epidemics for all basic control 
strategies in all DPLA starting areas, the between-herd reproduction number at 
the time of the first detection is above unity, which agrees with the findings in 
our previous study (Boender et al., 2006). The peak of the epidemic curve for 
the 5-km vaccination strategy is lower and earlier than for the 2-km vaccination 
strategy, indicating more effective control of the epidemic. The 5-km vaccina-
tion strategy even curbs the epidemic so effectively that it halts the epidemic 
earlier than the culling strategy, thus explaining the comparable outbreak size, 
but the shorter outbreak duration. It must be noted though that the differences 
between the basic control strategies are smaller for the 'less dense' DPLAs 
(Oost-Nederland and Noord-Brabant), suggesting that the relative performances 
of the basic control strategies strongly depend on the local farm density. 
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2.6.3 Results for strategies excluding hobby farms from preemptive culling 
 
For non-commercial farms three alternative strategies are evaluated that all in-
volve the exception of hobby farms from preemptive culling. For the culling 
strategy (cul1h) this means that the minimal strategy applies to hobby farms, 
i.e. a hobby farm is only culled when an infection is detected in the herd. For the 
vaccination strategies (vac2h and vac5h), the hobby farms are not preemptively 
culled in the first week after the first detection, but after this period they are 
vaccinated like the commercial farms. Table 2.5 and figures 2.11, 2.12 and 
2.13 show that these alternative measures do not affect the outbreak size or 
duration. Statistical analysis (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) reveals that the alterna-
tive strategies are not significantly different from the basic control strategies. 
The alternative strategies have little effect, because from all infected farms only 
a small percentage (not more than 4%) are hobby farms. A more important rea-
son however that is once a hobby farm is infected, the infectivity for other farms 
is so low that the probability of secondary infections is very small (making a 
hobby farm a 'dead end host'). 
 Hobby farms can be excluded from preemptive culling without altering the 
effect of control measures. The total number of farms that need to be preemp-
tively culled reduces by about 20%, and the number of animals to be culled 
by 3%. 
 
2.6.4 Results for strategies excluding pig farms from vaccination 
 
For pig farms an alternative strategy is evaluated, by excluding pig farms from 
vaccination in the 2-km and 5-km vaccination strategy (vac2p and vac5p). The 
most important advantages of this alternative are the smaller vaccination capac-
ity that is needed (as an average pig farm is ten times larger than an average 
cattle farm) and an assured pig export position (as vaccinated meat is not 
automatically permitted on international markets). Compared to the basic con-
trol strategies of 2-km and 5-km vaccination where all farms are vaccinated, ex-
cluding the pig farms from vaccination leads to larger and longer epidemics 
(table 2.5 and figures 2.14 and 2.15). The median epidemic length is increased 
by 0-9 days and the median outbreak size by 0-13 detected farms. Although the 
differences are significant (except for the results of Oost-Nederland), they are 
not very large (for the virus strain under study). Before drawing conclusions we 
need to falsify the possible explanation that most pig farms are already preemp-
tively culled in the first week after the first detection. For this reason we repeat-
ed the vaccination strategies (vac2p, vac2p, vac5 and vac5p) with only two 
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days (instead of seven) of preemptive culling before vaccination starts. As ex-
pected, all strategies yielded larger and longer epidemics, but the relative dif-
ferences between including and excluding pig farms in the vaccination campaign 
are the same. From this we can conclude that pig farms play a significant but 
limited role in the transmission process (again, for the virus strain under study). 
Although excluding pig farms from vaccination does increase the risk of large 
epidemics, it reduces the required vaccination capacity considerably (the num-
ber of animals to be vaccinated more than halves). Whether this strategy is 
economically beneficial despite the increased risk, will be evaluated in the sec-
ond part of this report. 
 
2.6.5 Results for a sparsely populated livestock area 
 
One starting situation has been evaluated that involves a sparsely populated live-
stock area (SPLA) in Friesland, where the hypothetical epidemics start in a cattle 
farm. Four control strategies, i.e. the minimal strategy (min) and the three basic 
strategies (cul1, vac2 and vac5), are compared in table 2.5 and 2.6. Epidemics 
are much smaller, in terms of both outbreak size and duration. Due to the smaller 
epidemics, the differences between the basic control strategies disappear. The 
minimal control strategy leads to slightly larger outbreaks, but this is only caused 
by a small number of simulated epidemics that jump to denser areas, such as 
Oost-Nederland. As long as the epidemic stays in an SPLA, the minimal control 
strategy is sufficient to control the epidemic and additional control measures do 
not provide any added value. When the epidemic also starts affecting denser ar-
eas, additional control is needed as shown in the previous sections. This conclu-
sion is in agreement with a previous study (Boender et al., 2006) that compared 
the basic control strategies using risk maps of the Netherlands. 
 
2.6.6 Sensitivity to between-species differences 
 
The epidemics in the previous sections were simulated using a heterogeneous 
transmission kernel (figure 2.5), that is based on literature and expert opinion. 
To assess the effect of these assumptions, the results (table 2.5) are compared 
with simulations using a homogeneous transmission kernel (table 2.8). This 
means that an average cattle farm is equally infectious as average pigs, 
sheep/goats or hobby farm during their infectious period (differences in number 
of infectious animals on a farm is still accounted for) and all susceptible herds 
are equally susceptible, regardless of size or species. Seven of nine control 
strategies are evaluated, all except the alternative vaccination strategies for 
66 
hobby farms. Table 2.8 shows that the homogeneous epidemics have smaller 
outbreak sizes and shorter durations. They are less severe (compare for in-
stance the results for the minimal control strategy), because they lack the effect 
of 'super spreaders' such as infected pig farms in the heterogeneous model. 
This effect of heterogeneity between species is mathematically described by 
Diekmann and Heesterbeek (2000). The effect of spatial heterogeneity (i.e. non-
Poisson distributed farm densities) also leads to higher disease persistence 
(Hagenaars et al., 2004). Because of the smaller epidemics, the differences be-
tween the basic control strategies (cul1, vac2 and vac5) diminish, as was also 
observed in the SPLA simulations (previous section). Interestingly, the differ-
ences between the basic vaccination strategies (vac2 and vac5) and the vacci-
nation strategies that exclude pig farms (vac2p and vac5p), vanish completely. 
The degree of vaccination in the latter strategies is apparently sufficiently high 
to halt the epidemic. This is not the case for the alternative culling strategy for 
hobby farms (cul1h) that leads to larger outbreaks than the basic culling strat-
egy (cul1). Here the degree of preemptive culling does not seem sufficient, due 
to the higher hobby farm densities. As hobby farms are now infectious to other 
farms (in contrast to the 'dead end hosts' they were with the heterogeneous 
transmission kernel), they can serve as 'stepping stones' in propagating the 
epidemic. The assumption of a fully homogeneous transmission kernel will obvi-
ously not hold in practice; different species and herd types will also differ in in-
fectivity and susceptibility. It should be kept in mind though, that the relative 
performances of the evaluated control strategies depend on the degree of het-
erogeneity used in the model (see figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.8 Epidemic curves for minimal control strategy: median values 
of number of infectious farms (solid line) and 90% interval 
(shaded area) for four different starting situations 
number of infectious farms (5%-50%-95%) 
  
  
time since first detection (days) 
 
Figure 2.9 Required capacity for of (a) culling and (b) vaccination for the 
basic control strategies: median values (thick lines) and 95% 
quantiles (thin lines) for preemptive ring culling (solid) and 
ring vaccination within 2-km radius (dashed) and 5-km radius 
(dotted) in the Gelderse Vallei, start in cattle farm 
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Figure 2.10 Epidemic curves for the basic control strategies: preemptive 
ring culling (solid black) and ring vaccination within 2-km ra-
dius (dotted blue) and 5-km radius (dashed magenta); median 
values of number of infectious farms (thick line) and 95% per-
centile (thin line) for four different starting situations 
number of infectious farms (50%-95%) 
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Figure 2.11 Epidemic curves for preemptive ring culling (solid black) and 
preemptive ring culling except hobby farms (dashed green); 
median values of number of infectious farms (thick line) and 
90% interval (shaded area) for four different starting situa-
tions 
number of infectious farms (5%-50%-95%) 
  
  
time since first detection (days) 
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Figure 2.12 Epidemic curves for preemptive ring culling (solid black) and 
preemptive ring culling except hobby farms (dashed green); 
median values of number of infectious farms (thick line) and 
90% interval (shaded area) for four different starting situa-
tions 
number of infectious farms (5%-50%-95%) 
  
  
time since first detection (days) 
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Figure 2.13 Epidemic curves for ring vaccination within 5-km radius (solid 
magenta) and ring vaccination within 5-km radius except cull-
ing hobby farms in first week (dashed purple); median values 
of number of infectious farms (thick line) and 90% interval 
(shaded area) for four different starting situations 
number of infectious farms (5%-50%-95%) 
  
  
time since first detection (days) 
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Figure 2.14 Epidemic curves for ring vaccination within 2-km radius (solid 
blue) and ring vaccination within 2-km radius except pig 
farms (dashed cyan); median values of number of infectious 
farms (thick line) and 90% interval (shaded area) for four dif-
ferent starting situations 
number of infectious farms (5%-50%-95%) 
  
  
time since first detection (days) 
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Figure 2.15 Epidemic curves for ring vaccination within 5-km radius (solid 
magenta) and ring vaccination within 5-km radius except pig 
farms (dashed purple); median values of number of infectious 
farms (thick line) and 90% interval (shaded area) for four dif-
ferent starting situations 
number of infectious farms (5%-50%-95%) 
  
  
time since first detection (days) 
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3 Freedom of infection 
 
 
Authors: Jantien Backer, Thomas Hagenaars, Gonnie Nodelijk, Herman van 
Roermund 
 
 
3.1 Introduction: freedom of infection 
 
The country is divided into 20 compartments with clear boundaries, such as riv-
ers, highways, et cetera (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, 
2003). During an epidemic, strict regulations apply in the compartments with in-
fected farms. Around every confirmed infected and subsequently culled herd a 
3-km protection zone ('beschermingsgebied') and a 10-km surveillance zone 
('toezichtsgebied') are set up. Depending on the control strategy a 2-km or 5-km 
vaccination zone may apply around a detected herd. These vaccination zones 
do not influence the outer radius of the protection or surveillance zones. This 
means that with the 2-km vaccination strategy the vaccination zone stretches 
from 0 to 2km around an infected herd, the protection zone from 2 to 3km and 
the surveillance zone from 3 to 10km. With the 5-km vaccination strategy, the 
vaccination zone stretches from 0 to 5km around an infected herd and the sur-
veillance zone from 5 to 10km (effectively cancelling the protection zone). 
 All farms in these zones are closed and strict transport regulations apply. To 
lift these constraints after the epidemic, EU regulation requires that the affected 
areas are without outbreak for at least 30 days before an end screening may 
take place to substantiate freedom of infection. When the survey has been con-
cluded with negative results, the country can be declared free to resume inter-
national trade. 
 The end screening consists of clinical inspection and serological testing. All 
animals of susceptible species on all farms within the surveillance zones of 
10km, which include the protection zone and - if applicable - the vaccination 
zone, must be clinically examined. Depending on the zone (vaccination, protec-
tion or surveillance) and the end-screening strategy applied, blood samples are 
taken from a number of animals for serological testing. 
 Even though the end screening can take place at day 30 after the last out-
break in a surveillance area, in practice the decision to start the end screening 
also depends on the number of cases, expert opinion, et cetera. In the model 
analyses we will perform the end screening at the end of each simulated epi-
88 
demic, and we will only consider the serological screening. Clinical inspection 
would not yield any positive results, as at the end of a simulated epidemic all in-
fected animals have either been detected or have recovered. It is assumed that 
all recovered animals have seroconverted (justified by the fact that the serocon-
version rate is also reflected in the test sensitivity) and could be detected in the 
serological survey. In this way the end screening is focused on detecting sero-
positive non-infectious animals that were missed during the epidemic, and that 
might pose a risk to the export position of the country. 
 For our analyses the end screening is described by a model. Depending on 
the end screening strategy, the test characteristics, the herd size and the num-
ber of seropositive animals on the farm, we calculate the probabilities of the 
herd to be declared positive or negative, with or without retesting (retesting of a 
farm means using the same test again for a new blood sample of the positively 
tested animal(s) and animals that are in close contact with them). This end-
screening model is applied to each farm that needs to be screened at the end 
of an epidemic, depending on the end-screening strategy. The EU-required 
strategy serves as a starting point and we will examine a less stringent and a 
more stringent alternative, as well as the combination. We will use the results of 
the simulated epidemics (chapter 2) to evaluate the performance of the different 
end-screening strategies, when different control strategies have been applied 
during the epidemic. 
 
 
3.2 End-screening model 
 
When a herd is subjected to a serological screening, several steps need to be 
taken, both in practice and in the model. The flow diagram shown in figure 3.1 
represents this process for the model schematically. The flow diagram largely 
follows the procedure as will most probably be used in a real outbreak situation, 
but for the model situation we can make some shortcuts as the true disease 
status of each animal in the model is known. First, the test characteristics of the 
test used for serological screening must be known. Both the sensitivity and 
specificity can differ for different animal types and vaccination status (see sec-
tion 3.2.1). Next, the end-screening strategy for the herd must be determined, 
depending on the animal species, vaccination status and whether the farm is lo-
cated in the protection or surveillance zone. For the most part the end-screen-
ing strategy is specified in EU council directive 2003/85/EC (see section 3.3). 
We will examine this strategy, as well as some less and more stringent alterna-
tives. With the test sensitivity and the end-screening strategy, we can determine 
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the number of animals that must be sampled (see section 3.2.2; here we will 
find that some farms are so small that the specified level of certainty cannot be 
achieved). When we set the herd specificity to 99.99% and with the sample size 
and the test specificity known, we can determine a threshold value D+ for the 
number of false positives in the sample (see section 3.2.3). We will use this 
threshold later on to compare with the actual number of positive test results. 
Next, we will calculate the distribution of the number of positive test results T+, 
that is a combination of the distribution of the number of true positive test re-
sults T+true, and the distribution of the number of false positive test results, T+false 
(see section 3.2.4). Depending on the total number of positive results  
T+ (= T+true + T+false) three situations can occur. When all results are negative  
(T+ = 0), the herd is immediately declared negative. When the number of posi-
tive test results is equal to or higher than the upper limit for false positives  
(T+?D+), the chance that these are all false positives is 0.01% or less. Retesting 
of the herd seems unnecessary; instead, the herd is immediately declared posi-
tive and subsequently culled. When the number of positive test results is in be-
tween these extremes (0<T+<D+), the herd needs to be retested. In practice, 
new samples will be taken from the previously sampled animals (in the first test 
round) and animals around them. When the animals are tested positive again 
and evidence of clustering is found (i.e. animals around the positive animal are 
also tested positive), the herd is declared positive. When no evidence of cluster-
ing is found, only the positive animals are culled and the farm is declared nega-
tive. In the model, the herd will not actually be tested again, but we use a model 
representation for retesting of the herd instead. This shortcut is allowed, as we 
know the distribution of true and false positive test results. The follow-up is as-
sumed to be infallible, meaning that when the positive test results contain true 
positives (T+true>0), the farm will be declared positive and when the positive test 
results do not contain any true positives (T+true = 0), the farm is declared nega-
tive. 
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Figure 3.1 Flow diagram of end-screening model a) 
determine end screening 
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a) Nsample is the number of animals in the sample, D+ is the 99.99% threshold value of false positives, T+ is the 
number of positive test results (of which T+true are true positives and T+false are false positives) 
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3.2.1 Test characteristics 
 
For the serological end screening the Ceditest will be used. This is an ELISA test 
that detects antibodies against non-structural (NS) proteins of the FMD virus. As 
these NS proteins are only present in animals that are infected by a (replicating) 
wild type virus (and not in vaccinated animals), the test can be used to distin-
guish between vaccinated non-infected and vaccinated infected animals. Two 
recent studies have examined the performance of this test. Brocchi et al. 
(2006) examined several species of susceptible animals, but the testing num-
bers for sheep and pigs are small. Engel et al. (2008) have analysed the data 
for cattle in a Bayesian framework. 
 Brocchi et al. (2006) estimated the test sensitivity for non-vaccinated cattle 
as 100% (94.6-100), meaning all infected unvaccinated animals are detected. 
The confidence interval is reasonably broad, because of the relatively small 
number of animals tested (n=54). In the Bayesian analysis the sensitivity is es-
timated as 97% (90.8-99.4) (Engel et al., 2008). This might be an underestima-
tion as the model assumes that all animals have seroconverted before 21 days 
post infection. In the model calculations we assume a test sensitivity for non-
vaccinated cattle of 98%. 
 The test sensitivity for vaccinated cattle increases with the time since infec-
tion; measured detection rates range from 48.6% to 74.5% (Brocchi et al., 
2006). The Bayesian analysis however estimates a higher sensitivity of 85% 
(78.9-89.7). The discrepancy is partly explained by the fact that the former re-
sults are for experimentally infected vaccinated cattle only, and the latter for 
both experimental and field data. In the model calculations we assume a con-
servative test sensitivity for vaccinated cattle of 70%. 
 The test specificity for non-vaccinated cattle is estimated as 97.2% (Brocchi 
et al., 2006) and in the Bayesian analysis as 97% (95.8-98.2) (Engel et al., 
2008). For vaccinated cattle the specificity is estimated to be higher: 99.5% 
(Brocchi et al., 2006) and 99% (97.9-99.5) (Engel et al., 2008). Even though re-
testing the positive samples would increase the specificity (especially for non-
vaccinated animals, Brocchi et al., 2006), it is probable that the farm will also 
be revisited to take extra samples. For the model we choose a test specificity 
for non-vaccinated cattle of 99% and for vaccinated cattle of 97%. 
 Brocchi et al. (2006) report on only a small number of sheep and pigs 
(9 non-vaccinated sheep, 6 vaccinated sheep, 12 non-vaccinated pigs and 18 
vaccinated pigs). As a consequence, the confidence intervals for the test sensi-
tivity and specificity are very broad and include the values for cattle. Therefore, 
we assume that the test characteristics for sheep and pigs are the same as 
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forCcattle. Table 3.1 summarises all test sensitivities and specificities used in 
the model. The values were discussed with and agreed by FMD virologists (CVI). 
 
Table 3.1 Test characteristics in the model 
 Sensitivity Specificity 
 non-vaccinated vaccinated non-vaccinated vaccinated 
Cattle 0.98 0.70 0.97 0.99 
Sheep 0.98 0.70 0.97 0.99 
Pigs 0.98 0.70 0.97 0.99 
 
3.2.2 Determination of sample sizes 
 
To determine the required sample size (to detect the design prevalence with a 
prescribed certainty), the probability P not to detect any true positive animal in 
the sample is calculated. This probability is related to the total number of ani-
mals N, the sample size n and the test sensitivity se. When S out of N animals 
are seropositive, we calculate the probability that none of the S seropositive 
animals is detected (P(T+true=0)) by considering all possibilities that i seropositive 
animals are present in the sample. For each of these possibilities the probability 
is calculated that none of the i seropositive animals are detected (with a prob-
ability of (1-se) each) and all of these probabilities are summed: 
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 An end-screening scenario denoted by 5/95 in table 3.2, means that for an 
assumed true within-herd prevalence of 5%, the required sample size is such 
that probability 1-P is larger than or equal to 95% (i.e. at least one true positive 
animal is detected with 95% certainty). By setting S to 0.05 N in Eq. 3.1 the 
                                                
1 When the non-perfect specificity is taken into account, instead of Eq. 3.1  
??
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D
t
truetrue TtTPTP  [3.1.b] 
should be used, where P(T+=t|T+true=0) is defined by Eq. 3.5 and D+ is a threshold value determined 
by the herd specificity (see section 3.2.4). When the herd specificity is sufficiently high, the difference 
between Eq. 3.1 and 3.1.2 is negligible. 
93 
minimal sample size nmin is calculated by solving the inequality 1-P(T+true = 0) 
? 0.95. Figure 3.2 shows the calculated minimal sample sizes as a function of 
herd size, for the three possible situations in the end-screening scenario. When 
the discrete nature of the number of seropositive animals is taken into account 
(i.e. by setting S to ?0.05 N?), the lines in figure 3.2 become tooth saws. This is 
done in the analyses, but omitted in the figure because of clarity reasons. As an 
illustration, the 5/95 sample size for a non-vaccinated cattle farm of 100 ani-
mals is 46 animals (test sensitivity of 98%), for a non-vaccinated pig farm of 
1,000 animals 58 animals (test sensitivity of 98%) and for a vaccinated sheep 
farm of 100 animals 64 animals (test sensitivity of 70%). 
 
Figure 3.2 Minimal sample size nmin as a function of total number of ani-
mals N, when at least one seropositive animal is detected with 
at least 95% certainty at a design seroprevalence of 5% with 
a test sensitivity of 98% (solid black line) or 70% (solid gray 
line) or when all animals are tested (nmin = N, dashed line) 
nmin 
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 N 
 
 For small farms the seroprevalence cannot be as low as required (5%) be-
cause of the limited number of animals and/or the certainty level cannot be as 
high as required (95%) because of the low sensitivity. The safest option, de-
spite the fact that the requirements are not met, is to test all animals. This is 
the case for non-vaccinated farms up to 22 animals and vaccinated farms up 
to 45 animals (where the solid black and gray lines start to deviate from the 
dashed line in figure 3.2). 
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3.2.3 Determination of threshold value of false positives in sample 
 
Suppose that all animals in a sample of size n are truly seronegative. The num-
ber of false positives T+false in this sample, i.e. the animals that test positive, fol-
lows a binomial distribution: 
 
? ? tntfalse spsp
t
n
tTP ?? ????
?
???
??? 1)(
. 
[3.2] 
 
 Setting the herd specificity to 99.99%, the threshold value D+ is determined 
by calculating the upper 99.99% percentile of this distribution, i.e. finding the 
minimal value of T that satisfies: 
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Figure 3.3 Threshold value of false positives D+ as a function of sample 
size n with a test specificity 97% (solid black line) or 99% 
(solid gray line) 
D+
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 Obviously, this threshold value increases with increasing sample size (see 
figure 3.3). It serves as a decision tool whether the herd is retested or not. 
When the number of positive test results exceeds the threshold D+, the probabil-
ity that all positive test results are false positives is less than 0.01%. The herd is 
not retested and is declared positive. 
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3.2.4 Probability distribution of true and false positives in sample 
 
In a herd of N animals, S animals are seropositive (and so N-S animals are sero-
negative) and a sample of n animals is taken to be tested. To derive the prob-
ability distribution of T+, i.e. the number of animals that test positive in the 
sample, all combinations of seropositive animals in the sample and true and 
false positive results need to be considered. The probability for i truly positive 
animals in the sample follows from a Hypergeometric distribution with parame-
ters n, S and N. The probability that k of these i true positives in the sample in-
deed test (truly) positive follows from a Binomial distribution with parameters i 
and se. The probability that (t-k) of the remaining (n-i) true negatives in the sam-
ple test (falsely) positive follows from a Binomial distribution with parameters  
(n-i) and (1-sp). Together, this yields the probability for T+ = T+true + T+false animals 
that test positive in the sample: 
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[3.4] 
 
 The variables in this equation are schematically represented by: 
 
    k test (truly) positive (= T+true) 
  i true positives    
    i-k test (falsely) negative (= T-false) 
n animals in 
the sample 
     
    t-k test (falsely) positive (= T+false) 
  n-i true negatives    
    (n-i)-(t-k) test (truly) negative (= T-true) 
 
and 
 
T+ = T+true + T+false = k + (t-k) = t 
T- = T-true + T-false = (i-k) + (n-i-t+k) = n-t 
 
96 
 Note that Eq. 3.1 is recovered when t=0 and sp=1 and Eq. 3.2 when S=0. 
For our retesting model we will also need the probability of finding zero true 
positives in a sample (so all seropositive animals test negative): 
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which is derived from Eq. 3.4 by setting k=0. With Eq. 3.4 and 3.5 we can cal-
culate the probability that a herd is declared positive or negative, with or without 
retesting (retesting here means that when a seropositive animal is present in the 
first sample, it will be detected), i.e. the probability of each of the four routes in 
figure 3.1: 
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 As an illustration the probability distribution is calculated for a vaccinated pig 
farm of N = 200 animals with a seroprevalence of 5%, i.e. the number of sero-
positive animals is 0.05 N =10. With a test sensitivity of 70% the sample size 
required for the 5/95 strategy, is 73 animals (Eq. 3.1). With a test specificity of 
99% the threshold value D+ is calculated to be 5 animals (Eq. 3.3). Figure 3.4 
shows the corresponding probability distribution of positive test results. The 
probability that the herd is tested negative without retesting (T+ = 0) is 2.4% 
(and not 100-95=5%, due to the contribution of false positive test results), 
shown by the white bar in figure 3.4. All positive test results equal to or higher 
than the threshold value (T+ ? D+) leads to declaring the herd positive without re-
testing (cumulative probability of 20.7%, dark gray bars in figure 3.4). The 
probability to retest the herd (0 <T+ <D+) is 76.9%, of which 2.6% does not con-
tain a true positive animal (and the herd is declared negative, light gray bars in 
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figure 3.4) and of which the remaining 74.3% is the probability that the herd is 
declared positive after retesting (gray bars in figure 3.4). The probability to 
falsely declare the herd positive is 5%, which is in agreement with the 5% (100-
95) certainty level required for a herd with a 5% seroprevalence. In practice the 
seroprevalence of a herd is unknown, and it is therefore unknown whether a 
farm is truly or falsely declared positive. 
 
Figure 3.4 Probability distribution for number of positive test results T+, 
consisting of probabilities to declare a herd negative without 
retesting (white bar) and with retesting (light gray bars) and 
to declare a herd positive with retesting (gray bars) and with-
out retesting (dark gray bars) for N = 200, n = 73, S = 10, 
D+ = 5, se = 0.70 and sp = 0.9 
P(T+) 
 
T+ 
 
 
3.3 End-screening strategies 
 
The end screening that must take place to declare a country free of infection, 
involves a clinical examination and a serological surveillance. While all animals in 
the vaccination, protection and surveillance zones need to be clinically exam-
ined, only a part of the animals need to be sampled for serological screening. 
Here we will only focus on the serological surveillance. 
 The EU-council directive 2003/85/EC specifies guidelines for the serological 
end screening. It states that on all vaccinated farms (without distinguishing be-
tween commercial and hobby farms), all animals must be serologically tested, 
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regardless of animal species. In the protection (3km) and surveillance (10km) 
zones, the non-vaccinated cattle and pig herds do not need to be sampled (rea-
soning that an infection would not have escaped clinical detection during the 
epidemic, as the clinical signs are very apparent). In non-vaccinated sheep 
farms it is more likely that an infection has escaped clinical detection. In the 
protection zone all non-vaccinated sheep herds must be examined, by taking a 
sample size that would detect at least 5% seroprevalence with at least 95% cer-
tainty. In the surveillance zone not all non-vaccinated sheep farms are tested, 
but only so many to detect a between-herd prevalence of at least 2% (with 95% 
certainty), while the design within-herd prevalence is still 5% (with 95% cer-
tainty). This end-screening scenario is marked as 'EU' in table 3.2. 
 We will study the strategy of the EU directive in our model calculations, but 
we will also study a more relaxed and a more stringent alternative, as well as 
the combination of both. Serological testing of all animals on a vaccinated farm, 
is especially cumbersome for pig farms that are usually much larger than cattle 
or sheep farms. Therefore, we will also implement the recommendation of the 
Epizone workshop (held in Tervuren, Belgium in January 2007), to test only a 
sample of the vaccinated pigs that would detect a seroprevalence of at least 5% 
with at least 95% certainty. In this end-screening scenario, called 'EU-' less ef-
fort is put into the sampling than strictly required by the EU. In the 'EU+' sce-
nario more effort is put into the end screening by also sampling non-vaccinated 
cattle and pig farms, in the same way as non-vaccinated sheep farms. Finally, 
the 'EU+-' scenario combines both alternatives, i.e. sampling less vaccinated 
pigs and more non-vaccinated cattle and pigs. Table 3.2 summarises the four 
end-screening strategies studied in our analyses. 
 The sample sizes are determined for and taken from one epidemiological 
unit. For small farms (such as cattle and sheep farms) the epidemiological unit is 
the farm itself, but larger farms (such as pig farms) are divided in epidemiologi-
cal units of a maximum of 1,000 animals each. 
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Table 3.2 Strategies for serological end screening in the model; 5/95 
means a sample size of animals on a farm that would detect 
at least 5% seroprevalence with at least 95% certainty; 2/95 
means a sample size of farms that would detect at least 2% 
of the farms (with at least 5% seroprevalence) with at least 
95% certainty 
 Vaccination zone 
(2 or 5km) 
vacc. herds 
Protection zone 
(3km) 
non-vacc. herds 
Surveillance zone 
(10km) 
non-vacc. herds 
strategy  herds animals herds animals herds animals 
EU cattle all all none none none none 
 sheep all all all 5/95 2/95 b) 5/95 
 pigs all all  none none none none 
EU- cattle all all none none none none 
 sheep all all all 5/95 2/95 b) 5/95 
 pigs all 5/95 none none none none 
EU+ cattle all all all 5/95 2/95 a) 5/95 
 sheep all all all 5/95 2/95 b) 5/95 
 pigs all all  all 5/95 2/95 c) 5/95 
EU+- cattle all all all 5/95 2/95 a) 5/95 
 sheep all all all 5/95 2/95 b) 5/95 
 pigs all 5/95 all 5/95 2/95 c) 5/95 
a) Equivalent to 56% of the cattle farms; b) Equivalent to 55% of the commercial sheep farms (and 66% of hobby 
sheep farms); c) Equivalent to 66% of the pig farms. 
 
 For the end-screening strategies that involve only a part of the herds (i.e. the 
2/95 scenarios in the surveillance zones), we need to determine the number of 
herds to be tested. It can be calculated for each surveillance zone separately 
using Eq. 3.1, but the large overlaps between the zones make an exact calcula-
tion difficult. Instead, we calculate the average fraction of herds that need to be 
tested in a surveillance zone (i.e. between 3 and 10km around a detected herd, 
and between 5 and 10km for the 5-km vaccination strategy) for each species. 
These fractions are 0.56 for cattle, 0.55 for sheep, 0.66 for pigs and 0.66 for 
hobby farms. The probability of detection is multiplied by the appropriate frac-
tion to account for the possibility that the herd is not included in the serological 
survey. 
 The probability that a herd is tested negative (with or without retesting) is 
multiplied by the number of seropositive animals on the farm that are missed 
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during the epidemic. This gives the average number of seropositive animals that 
remain after the end screening that will be used in comparing the results of the 
different end-screening scenarios. 
 
 
3.4 Results and discussion: freedom of infection 
 
At the end of each hypothetical epidemic the end screening is simulated. Around 
each detected herd a 3-km protection zone and a 10-km surveillance zone is set 
up (the vaccination zone was of course already determined during the simulation 
of the epidemic). All herds in these zones are identified and depending on the 
species and end-screening strategy, it is determined whether a herd needs to 
be tested and if so, which sampling protocol to follow. Depending on the farm 
size, the required sample size is calculated. From the results of the epidemic it 
is known how many seropositive animals are still present on the farm. With the 
end-screening model that was outlined in section 3.2 the probability of detecting 
the herd is calculated. One minus is the probability of declaring the herd nega-
tive. Multiplied with the number of seropositive animals on the farm after the 
epidemic, it gives the number of seropositive animals remaining on the farm af-
ter the end screening. The total number of seropositive animals after the end 
screening is obtained by summing the number of seropositive animals per farm 
over all tested farms. This is a measure for the risk that seropositive animals 
pose, when we assume that each seropositive animal contributes equally to the 
total risk. 
 Due to the large amount of herds to be tested, the end-screening strategies 
are only evaluated for the minimal strategy (min), the three basic control strate-
gies (cul1, vac2 and vac5) and the two alternative strategies for pig farms 
(vac2p and vac5p) and only for the situation where epidemics are seeded on a 
cattle farm in the Gelderse Vallei. The results for other strategies and starting 
situations are not expected to be fundamentally different. 
 
3.4.1 Results for numbers of (re)tested farms and animals 
 
In the end screening, the number of farms that needs to be tested differs 
largely, depending on the epidemic, the control strategy and the end-screening 
strategy (see table 3.3). The minimal strategy requires a large number of farms 
to be tested (around 20,000), because of the large outbreak sizes. The culling 
strategy always requires fewer herds to be tested (around 2,500) than any vac-
cination strategy, since all vaccinated herds must be screened. In the basic EU-
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screening strategy, the median of the number of tested herds for the 2-km and 
5-km vaccination strategies is similar, around 5,500 herds. This is because the 
5-km vaccination strategy is more effective than 2-km ring vaccination; even 
though 5-km vaccination involves more vaccinated herds that need to be tested; 
it affects a smaller area, resulting in a number of tested herds similar to 2-km 
vaccination. The screening strategies testing less vaccinated pigs (EU- and  
EU+-) do not affect the number of herds to be tested, only the number of ani-
mals per farm. The screening strategies testing more unvaccinated cattle and 
pigs however (EU+ and EU+-), largely increase the number of herds to be 
tested. The increase is largest for the culling strategy (more than double), as 
the screening areas contain only unvaccinated farms. The increase is smallest 
for the 5-km vaccination strategy, because of the smaller proportion of unvacci-
nated farms in the tested farms. Finally, around half of all the tested farms, 
must be retested, fairly independent of control or end-screening strategy. 
 In the number of animals to be tested the differences between the control 
and end-screening strategies are larger, compared to the number of tested 
herds. Comparing the culling and vaccination strategies for the EU-screening 
strategy, the number of tested animals is six to twenty times higher for the vac-
cination strategies. The largest part of these animals is vaccinated pigs: when 
pig farms are excluded from vaccination, the number of tested animals is halved 
(compare vac2p to vac2 and vac5p to vac5). A similar effect is brought about 
by the EU- strategy: by testing only a 5/95 sample on vaccinated pig farms, the 
number of tested animals is halved as well. When more unvaccinated cattle and 
pig farms are sampled (EU+ strategy), the number of tested animals obviously 
increases. Again, this increase is largest for the control strategy with the most 
unvaccinated farms, i.e. min and cul1, and the smallest for the control strategy 
with the most vaccinated farms, i.e. the 5-km vaccination strategy vac5. When 
both alternative screening strategies are combined, the effect of sampling less 
vaccinated pigs and more unvaccinated cattle and pigs counteract. This is only 
beneficial for the vac2 and vac5 strategies (i.e. the only strategies in which pig 
farms are vaccinated), where the number of tested animals in the EU+- strategy 
is less than in the EU strategy. 
 From this we conclude that from a practical point of view it should be avoid-
ed to test all animals on pig farms. This can be achieved either by taking a 5/95 
sample on vaccinated pig farms, or by not vaccinating pig farms at all. Whether 
this increases the risk of not detecting seropositive animals will be studied in 
the next two sections. 
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3.4.2 Results for number of (un)detected farms 
 
The end screening is aimed at detecting the infected herds that were not de-
tected during the epidemic (see table 2.5). But, because only samples are 
tested and serological tests are not perfect, some of the infected herds will be 
declared (falsely) negative and some non-infected herds will be declared (falsely) 
positive. Table 3.4 shows the results of the end screening in terms of number of 
farms for the different control and end-screening strategies. 
 The largest part of the infected farms that were not detected during the epi-
demic are detected by the end screening. The minimal strategy yielded the 
largest number of not detected herds during the epidemic, so it shows the larg-
est number of detected herds during the end screening (around 105 farms 
tested truly positive). More interesting are the numbers of infected herds that 
are also missed by the end screening. For the minimal strategy 25 (15-36) 
farms are tested falsely negative, for 1-km culling 0.5 (0.0-2.4) farms are tested 
falsely negative, and for 2-km and 5-km vaccination 2.1 (0.3-6.3) and 1.5 (0.1-
4.5) farms are tested falsely negative. The (seropositive) animals that remain on 
these farms constitute the final risk after the country has been declared free of 
infection (see next section). When alternative end-screening strategies are ap-
plied, the number of true positive and false negative farms hardly shifts. This will 
be examined in more detail in the next section. 
 The number of falsely positive tested herds is directly related to the number 
of farms to be tested. The higher this number, the more false positive herds can 
be expected. Because of the high herd specificity of 99.99% the number of 
false positive herds per epidemic is limited (at a cost of a high retesting rate). 
For instance, when 5463 (2,122-10,420) herds are tested (2-km vaccination 
strategy with EU end-screening strategy, see table 3.3), 2.0 (0.7-3.8) farms are 
tested falsely positive. 
 
3.4.3 Results for seropositive animals remaining after the end screening 
 
With or without vaccination, a considerable number of the infected farms are not 
detected during the epidemic (see table 2.6). On such farms undetected ani-
mals remain that are assumed to have seroconverted, and that should be de-
tected during the end screening. In the model, carrier animals (about half of the 
seropositive cattle) were not explicitly modelled, as they do not play a significant 
role in the within- and between-herd transmission, but they are included in the 
group of seropositive animals. The total number of seropositive animals per 
epidemic differs largely for the different control strategies (see table 3.5(a)). 
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The minimal strategy (min) yields the highest number of undetected animals per 
epidemic (around 767) and the culling strategy (cul1) the lowest (around 8). Ring 
vaccination in 2km (vac2) produces more undetected animals (average of 50) 
than 5-km vaccination (vac5, average of 35), because of the higher effective-
ness and thus smaller epidemics of the latter strategy. 
 The end screening drastically reduces the number of undetected seroposi-
tive animals for all control strategies. These seropositive animals remain on 
farms that are falsely declared negative (see table 3.4), and as such these 
numbers are a measure of the risk posed by seropositive animals after the end 
screening. The average number of undetected animals after the basic EU end-
screening strategy is still very high (average of 62) for the minimal strategy, be-
cause of the high outbreak sizes. This number is the smallest for the culling 
strategy (average of 1.0), but the numbers for the vaccination strategies are 
only slightly higher (average of 3.5 for 2-km vaccination and 2.1 for 5-km vacci-
nation). The most important effect of the end screening however, is that for all 
strategies expect the minimal all 95% percentiles of the number of undetected 
animals are reduced to reasonably small absolute values (9.2 undetected ani-
mals in the country for the culling strategy and at most 20.3 for the vaccination 
strategies). The differences between the four vaccination strategies are again 
due to the different effectiveness of the control strategies. The larger an epi-
demic has been, the more farm outbreaks will have escaped clinical detection 
during the epidemic and the more undetected animals will remain after the end 
screening. 
 The number of seropositive animals remaining after the end screening 
slightly increases when less samples are taken on vaccinated pig farms (EU- 
strategy) and slightly decreases when more samples are taken on unvaccinated 
cattle and pig farms (EU+ strategy), but overall the alternative end-screening 
strategies have little effect. This can be explained by considering the number of 
seropositive animals per (undetected) farm for the different species and vacci-
nation status (see table 3.5(b)). Most undetected animals remain on unvacci-
nated sheep farms and on vaccinated cattle and sheep farms. The basic EU 
strategy already targets these three groups (sampling all vaccinated farms and 
a large part of the unvaccinated sheep farms), that leaves little room for de-
creasing the risks even further. As a consequence, sampling less animals on 
vaccinated pig farms (EU strategy) increases only the 95% percentile of the 
number of undetected animals, but does not alter the overall risk markedly 
(see table 3.5(a)). Conversely, sampling more animals on unvaccinated cattle 
and pig farms (EU+ strategy), will only decrease the 95% percentile of the num-
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ber of undetected animals for cattle farms, but the overall risk is again unaf-
fected (see table 3.5(a)). 
 From these calculations we conclude that when pig farms are vaccinated, it 
is safe to test only a 5/95 sample instead of all animals on these farms, and 
that testing more unvaccinated cattle and pig farms will not reduce the risk of 
seropositive animals after the end screening. 
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4 Economic consequences of different 
control strategies against FMD 
 
 
Authors: R. Bergevoet, C. van Wagenberg and N. Bondt 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The last outbreak of FMD on 26 farms in 2001 not only confronted the livestock 
sector with serious consequences and restrictions but it also had a large impact 
on society as a whole. This event did cost the Dutch society an amount of 
€900m. or 0.3% of its annual Gross National Product. The total costs for farm-
ers were estimated at €320m. For the other parts of the livestock chain the 
costs were estimated at €215m. and the cost for the tourism and recreation 
sector were estimated at €275m. (CPB 2001 cited by Huirne et al., 2002). 
A new epidemic of FMD in the Netherlands can have an equally large impact. 
Therefore it is worthwhile to investigate strategies that can limit the economic 
impact of new epidemics. 
 When evaluating the costs of an epidemic different components can be dis-
tinguished: ?
Direct costs related to the control of the epidemic 
These include the costs for the infrastructure for the control of the epidemic, 
the cost associated with culling and destroying of infected and contact ani-
mals, the costs associated with destruction of feed and milk on detected 
farms, and the compensation and vaccination costs. ?
Cost related to trade restrictions 
Due to an epidemic the national and international market access for animals 
of susceptible species and their products is restricted. An epidemic of FMD 
will result in trade restrictions that are related to the epidemic per se and do 
not depend on the specific characteristics of the control strategy chosen. 
After the last outbreak it takes time until all the restrictions in trade are lifted 
and the situation from before the epidemic is restored. ?
Ripple effects 
The effects from outbreaks of FMD that are felt upstream and downstream 
along the livestock value chain-breeding, feed production, input supply, 
slaughter, processing, final sale and consumption. 
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Spill-over effects 
The effects from outbreaks of FMD on tourism and other services. Since other 
than typical agricultural production is becoming more important for the rural 
economy these spill-over effect are likely to become a large part of the total 
epidemic costs. 
 
 In the previous chapters different control strategies were evaluated from an 
epidemiological perspective. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate, compare 
and rank the different simulated strategies to control and eradicate FMD from 
an economic perspective. The following questions will be addressed: 
1. What is the optimal strategy from an economic perspective: culling within 
1km zones, or vaccination 2 or 5 km around detected farms? 
2. What are the consequences of alternative strategies? 
a. excluding pigs from vaccination; 
b. excluding animals on hobby farms from preventive culling. 
3. What is the distribution of costs between animal species and cost types? 
4. What is the value loss of products of vaccinated animals? 
 
 For the calculations in this chapter we focus on the costs that differ between 
the strategies. We calculate the costs for the period from onset of the epidemic 
until the moment the Netherlands is officially declared FMD free, according to 
OIE standards1. Costs originating after this period are not calculated. 
 The remaining part of the chapter is structured as follows: paragraph 4.2 
describes the material and methods. Paragraph 4.3 gives the most important 
results, which will be discussed in paragraph 4.4. Paragraph 4.5 gives the con-
clusions and recommendations of the economic analysis. 
 
 
4.2 Material and methods 
 
Areas considered 
Research has shown that the epidemiology of an epidemic depends on the cho-
sen control strategy and on the animal density in the area in which outbreaks 
occurs. Therefore sparsely populated livestock areas (SPLA) and densely popu-
lated livestock areas (DPLA) are distinguished. 
                                                
1 OiE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Article 8.5.1; appendix 4 gives the text. 
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For the SPLA, the province of Friesland was chosen. In this area the minimal 
EU scenario, 1-km culling around each detected farm and 2-km and 5-km vacci-
nation around each infected farm were compared. 
For the DPLA, the 3 regions of Gelderse Vallei (area in the province of Geld-
erland), Oost-Nederland (Eastern part of the Netherlands) and the province of 
Noord-Brabant, were chosen. The minimal EU strategy was left out of the analy-
ses, because this strategy resulted in an endemic situation. In addition to the 1-
km culling around each detected farm and vaccination in 2km and 5km around 
each detected farm, the alternative strategies that exclude hobby farms from 
preemptive culling, or pig farms from vaccination, were considered. 
 
Material 
The epidemiological data as presented in chapter 3 were used as input for the 
economic calculations. To calculate the economic effects the following epidemi-
ological epidemic characteristics were used: ?
the number of farms that were infected, culled, and/or vaccinated, in a 
transport prohibition area; ?
the farm type (cattle, pig, sheep, hobby); ?
the compartments with infected farms; ?
the duration of the epidemic. 
 
 The epidemiological data contained information on the farm type and the 
number of animals. However within a species no distinction was made between 
the different animal categories. For example, the number of affected cattle were 
given but not whether these were dairy cows, veal calves or beef cattle. There-
fore, for the different regions also the number of animals and farm types were 
collected from CBS/LEI (Landbouwtelling). Based on these data 'hybrid' cattle 
farms and 'hybrid' pig farms were constructed. A hybrid farm contained the av-
erage distribution of different animal types typical for the region in which the 
farm was situated. A hybrid cattle farm consisted of dairy cows, young stock, 
veal calves and other cattle. A hybrid pig farm consisted of sows with piglets 
and fattening pigs. Input data for the economic evaluation were collected from 
available literature, consultation of experts and data sets (appendix 2 gives the 
details and the origin of the data). 
 
Method 
Different strategies (see paragraph 2.5) were evaluated from an economic 
perspective. To evaluate the economic consequences of the different control 
and eradication strategies a Partial Budget model was developed (Dijkhuizen en 
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Morris, 1997). In a Partial Budget model only the costs and benefits that differ 
between the evaluated alternatives are included. Therefore, the types of costs 
that do not or only differ marginally between strategies and therefore do not 
alter the order of the strategies, were excluded from the calculations. These 
include the costs that were related to the epidemic of FMD per se and did not 
depend on the control strategies, such as costs of non-FMD sensitive branches 
as horses, poultry and arable land and the costs of non-agricultural industry as 
tourism. The following costs were included in the calculations: 
- Operational costs 
These are costs related to the costs of crisis centres, tracking and tracing, 
clinical examination and clinical inspection and the costs of police involve-
ment in the enforcement of movement restrictions were estimated. Based 
on the total cost of the 2001 epidemic in the Netherlands (Huirne et al., 
2001), it was estimated that the fixed operational costs were €43m. and 
that the variable operational costs were €3m. per week. 
- Costs related to culled animals and destructed feed and milk 
The costs of culled animals is the number of culled animals times the value 
of each animal. The costs of destructed feed and milk are the number of cul-
led animal's times the average value per animal of the stock of feed and milk 
on the farm. 
- Costs of culling and disinfection culled farms 
The labour costs of culling of animals and disinfection of farms. 
- Costs of empty housing in culled farms 
The costs of empty housing between moment of culling and moment of re-
population after the epidemic and a 30-day period after last detection. 
- Costs of repopulation culled farms 
The culled farms incurred costs after repopulation because of suboptimal 
utilisation of their capacity. 
- Costs of vaccinating 
The labour costs of vaccination of animals and the vaccine costs. 
- Value loss of vaccinated animals 
The value loss of vaccinated animals is the number of vaccinated animals 
times the average value loss of each animal if sold on the Dutch market. The 
estimates for the value loss of products from vaccinated pigs were based 
on Hoste (2006). For veal calves they were based on De Rond (2008). Vac-
cinated hobby animals were not slaughtered and incurred no value loss. 
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- Value loss of milk from vaccinated animals and costs for logistic processes 
of milk from vaccinated animals 
During the epidemic and the 30-day period after last detection milk from 
vaccinated dairy cows is treated similar to non-vaccinated animals. The milk 
from vaccinated animals after this period has to be logistically processed for 
a period of 12 months and corresponding costs were calculated. It is as-
sumed that the most likely outlet for milk from vaccinated dairy cows will be 
cheese that will be sold within the EU. From 1,000 kg of raw milk can be 
produced: cheese (110 kg) and side products like whey powder (60.3 kg), 
butter (9 kg) and buttermilk powder (1 kg). Because it is assumed that the 
infrastructure to process relatively small amounts of side products does not 
exist, there will be value loss for these side products. This value loss is es-
timated by the dairy industry (NZO personal communication 2008) at 
€0.0825 per litre of raw milk. In addition, the costs related to the logistic 
processes to collect and separately process the milk from vaccinated ani-
mals are estimated at €0.015 per litre of raw milk. 
- Costs of logistic processing of vaccinated animals 
During the epidemic and the 30-day period after last detection vaccinated 
veal calves, pigs and sheep are processed similarly to non-vaccinated ani-
mals. Vaccinated animals that are still alive after this period, have to be lo-
gistically slaughtered and corresponding costs were calculated. Vaccinated 
hobby animals were not slaughtered and incurred no additional costs. 
- Costs of transportation prohibition of non-infected farms 
The costs of non-infected farms in a area with a transport prohibition for a  
6-week period because of missed returns were calculated. 
- Costs of empty houses and repopulation of non-infected farms in infected 
compartments 
We assumed that veal calves could not be imported in infected compart-
ments resulting in empty housing. Other animal types were sufficiently avail-
able in the Netherlands and in the area with movement restrictions to 
prevent empty housing. Veal calves that were slaughtered during the epi-
demic and the 30-day period after last detection, could not be replaced and 
the corresponding empty-housing and repopulation costs were calculated. 
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- Export market losses 
The costs of animals and products that because of an epidemic could not be 
exported to the normal markets, were calculated. During the epidemic and 
the 30-day period after last detection this concerned the EU and third coun-
tries markets for live animals, meat and meat products from all the Nether-
lands and for milk and milk products from infected compartments. After this 
period, this concerned the third countries market for live animals, meat, 
meat products, milk and milk products from infected compartments for an-
other 60 days without vaccination and for another 150 days with vaccination 
(according to OiE standards1). 
 
 
4.3 Results 
 
In this section the following results of the calculations are presented: ?
the 50% percentile value (50% of the results have a value that is lower than 
or equal to the presented value); ?
the 5% percentile and the 95% percentile (5% of the results have a value that 
is lower/higher than the presented value). 
 
 The 50% percentile can be considered an average2 outcome, whereas the 
5% percentile can be considered an optimistic and the 95% percentile a pessi-
mistic outcome. The results are presented as the difference in costs of a strat-
egy compared to a baseline strategy and per area and infection source. 
 
SPLA areas 
The cost of an epidemic in Friesland that starts in a cattle farm, as an example 
of an epidemic in an SPLA area, are presented in table 4.1. Table 4.1 compares 
the costs of the 1-km culling strategies (cul1) and 2-km (vac2) and 5-km (vac5) 
vaccination around each detected farm with the costs of the minimal EU strat-
egy (EU). The minimal EU strategy has a lower number of farms culled and 
lower costs compared to 1-km culling or the two vaccination strategies. How-
ever, the differences in total costs in the different strategies are small for all 
percentiles. 
 
                                                
1 OiE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Article 8.5.1; appendix 4 gives the text. 
2 In the strict definition the 50% percentile is the median and not the average. Only when the distribu-
tion of the results is normal the median and average are equal. 
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Table 4.1 Different strategies compared to the minimal EU strategy 
with an epidemic that starts in Friesland 
 Number of culled farms a) Last week of detection Total cost in million € 
 percentile percentile percentile 
 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
EU 7 2 46 3 1 12 58 48 102 
Difference with baseline scenario EU 
cul1  49 0 249 0 0 -4 3 0 7 
vac2  23 0 71 0 0 -4 3 0 6 
vac5 23 0 67 0 0 -6 7 0 19 
a) Includes hobby farms.  
 
DPLA areas 
Table 4.2 compares the costs of 2-km of 5-km vaccination around a detected 
farm to the costs of culling all susceptible farm animals in 1km around a de-
tected farm for the simulated epidemics in 4 DPLAs. Because application of the 
minimal EU strategy in DPLAs resulted in an endemic situation, no results are 
presented for this strategy. 
 
Culling strategies 
Table 4.2 shows that the total costs of the culling strategy vary between the re-
gions and between the 5%, 50% and 95% percentile. For example, in Gelderse 
Vallei start in cattle farm, the costs in the 5% percentile are €94m. and in the 
95% percentile €615m. 
 The costs in Oost-Nederland start in cattle farm are always lower than the 
costs in the other DPLAs, whereas the Gelderse Vallei always has the highest 
costs. The reason for this is the high number of farms and animals in the Gel-
derse Vallei. 
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Table 4.2 Different strategies compared to 1-km culling around a de-
tected farm 
 Number of culled farms a) Last week of detection Total cost in million € 
 percentile percentile percentile 
 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Gelderse Vallei start in cattle farm 
cul1 971 206 3217 9 4 15 236 94 615 
Difference with baseline scenario cul1 
vac2 -711 -136 -2510 1 1 2 -8 5 -89 
vac5 -741 -138 -2646 -3 0 -4 -8 12 -111 
Oost-Nederland start in cattle farm 
cul1 393 84 1595 6 3 13 110 67 327 
Difference with baseline scenario cul1 
vac2 -257 -48 -1126 1 0 3 9 -4 -12 
vac5 -261 -48 -1188 0 0 -3 37 3 28 
Gelderse Vallei start in pig farm 
cul1 1656 495 3980 9 5 15 334 140 728 
Difference with baseline scenario cul1 
vac2 -1150 -325 -2871 1 1 1 -31 1 -130 
vac5 -1192 -332 -3010 -2 -1 -4 -9 14 -75 
Noord-Brabant start in pig farm 
cul1 579 166 2030 7 4 14 185 98 483 
Difference with baseline scenario cul1 
vac2 -399 -105 -1531 0 0 2 -17 -4 -31 
vac5 -405 -106 -1615 -1 -1 -4 37 10 22 
a) Includes hobby farms. 
 
Vaccination strategies 
The vaccination strategies in which all for FMD susceptible animals in a circle of 
2km (vac2) or 5km (vac5) around each detected farm are vaccinated were 
compared with the strategy that involved 1-km culling around each detected 
farm (cul1). Table 4.2 indicates that vac5 is the preferred strategy in the aver-
age and pessimistic outcome in Gelderse Vallei start in cattle farm. In Oost-
Nederland and in Noord-Brabant vac5 is more expensive that culling. Vac2 has 
the lowest costs in Noord-Brabant in all outcomes and in the average and pes-
simistic outcome in Gelderse Vallei start in pig farm. 
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4.3.1 Alternative strategies: excluding pigs from vaccination 
 
As Bergevoet et al. (2007) have shown, vaccinating pigs in case of an epidemic 
of FMD or CSF has serious consequences for the pig industry and involves high 
costs. When evaluating the economic consequences of including or excluding 
pigs from vaccination in the control of FMD, a 'during the epidemic' phase and 
an 'after the epidemic' phase can be distinguished. 
 During the epidemic phase there is no difference between the possible des-
tinations of vaccinated and non-vaccinated fattening pigs in infected areas. The 
meat from animals in areas with movement restriction can only be consumed at 
the domestic Dutch market and piglets from breeding farms (vaccinated and 
non-vaccinated) can only be placed within the area with movement restrictions. 
During the epidemic phase export of animals and meat from animals is banned. 
When an area is confronted with an outbreak, according to the contingency 
plan, pig farmers have to be able to keep animals on their farm for a period of 
at least 6 weeks. This is to prevent the spread of the infection by movement of 
potentially infected animals. However, after this period serious welfare problems 
can occur on pig farms. Therefore, possibilities for the movement of animals to 
a slaughterhouse (for fattening farms) or the movement of piglets to fattening 
farms (for breeding farms) are included in the contingency plans. However, fat-
tening farms are less likely to accept vaccinated piglets on their farms, because 
of the high costs of logistic slaughtering and canalisation of the meat from vac-
cinated animals after the end of the epidemic (Bergevoet et al., 2007). 
 After the epidemic phase, when the Netherlands is officially declared free 
(30 days after last detection), export of animals and meat within the EU is pos-
sible. However, products of vaccinated pigs have to be processed separately 
(logistic slaughtering) from the products of non-vaccinated animals, because 
these have reduced market access (especially for countries outside the EU). 
Logistic slaughtering and reduced market access of products of vaccinated 
animals confronts the industry with substantial costs. Hoste et al. (2007) calcu-
lated a loss of €0.40 per kilogram of meat from vaccinated animals. 
 Vaccinated piglets and piglets born from vaccinated sows present an addi-
tional challenge for the pig industry. The Netherlands exports large numbers of 
live piglets to neighbouring countries. If pigs are included in a vaccination strat-
egy, after an epidemic usually live vaccinated pigs remain and new piglets are 
born from vaccinated sows. Vaccinated piglets have to be slaughtered logisti-
cally and the revenues of the products of these animals will be lower. The mar-
ket acceptance of vaccinated piglets, both in the domestic as well as in the 
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export market, is expected to be limited. This can result in serious economic 
consequences for the vaccinated sow farms. 
 Excluding pigs from vaccination might limit the consequences of an epi-
demic of FMD for the pig industry. Therefore, the situation in which pigs were 
excluded from vaccination is considered. As the results presented in chapter 2 
indicate, the epidemiological impact is limited. The number of outbreaks nor the 
duration of the total epidemic differ substantially from the outcomes in which 
vaccination of pigs is included. In this section the economic consequences are 
evaluated. Table 4.3, figure 4.1a and figure 4.1b show the results. 
 Table 4.3 shows that in almost all regions and independent of the size of the 
vaccination area, the total costs of an epidemic are lower when pigs are exclud-
ed from vaccination compared to when pigs are vaccinated. Only in Gelderse 
Vallei in the pessimistic outcomes with vaccinating in a 2-km area the costs 
when including pigs from vaccination (vac2) are lower than when excluding pigs 
from vaccination (vac2p). This is caused by the additional duration of the epi-
demic by 3 weeks in the pessimistic outcome and the large proportion of veal 
calves in Gelderse Vallei. For almost all regions and sizes of the vaccination 
area, costs of an epidemic are lower when pigs are excluded from vaccination 
compared to culling in 1km, except for the 5% and 50% percentile with vac5p in 
Oost-Nederland start in cattle farm and the 5% percentile with vac5P in Gelderse 
Vallei start in cattle farm. The reason for these lower costs is that no additional 
measures have to be taken by the pig industry to separate products of vacci-
nated and non-vaccinated pigs after the epidemic. Also no value loss occurs due 
to the presence of vaccinated pigs. 
 Figures 4.1a and 4.1b indicate that when pigs are excluded from vaccination 
the distribution of the costs changes. The share of the dairy industry in the 
costs not only increases relatively to the other animal species but also in-
creases in absolute terms in the average outcome. In Gelderse Vallei in the pes-
simistic outcome of vac2 the costs for the dairy sector increase more that that 
the cost for the pig sector decrease. 
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Table 4.3 Difference in costs between strategies where pigs are in-
cluded or excluded from the vaccination strategy (compared 
to the culling strategy) 
 Number of culled farms a) Last week of detection Total cost in million € 
 percentile percentile percentile 
 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Gelderse Vallei start in cattle farm 
vac2 -711 -136 -2,510 1 1 2 -8 5 -89 
vac2p -703 -135 -2,426 2 1 5 -16 0 -44 
vac5 -741 -138 -2,646 -3 0 -4 -8 12 -111 
vac5p -737 -138 -2,619 -2 0 -2 -39 3 -148 
Oost-Nederland start in cattle farm 
vac2 -257 -48 -1,126 1 0 3 9 -4 -12 
vac2p -257 -48 -1,122 1 0 3 -4 -7 -88 
vac5 -261 -48 -1,188 0 0 -3 37 3 28 
vac5p -262 -47 -1,189 -1 0 -3 19 2 -56 
Gelderse Vallei start in pig farm 
vac2 -1150 -325 -2,871 1 1 1 -31 1 -130 
vac2p -1140 -325 -2,805 2 1 4 -47 -8 -113 
vac5 -1192 -332 -3,010 -2 -1 -4 -9 14 -75 
vac5p -1189 -332 -2,982 -2 0 -2 -57 -2 -141 
Noord-Brabant start in pig farm 
vac2 -399 -105 -1,531 0 0 2 -17 -4 -31 
vac2p -398 -105 -1,492 0 0 4 -35 -9 -44 
vac5 -405 -106 -1,615 -1 -1 -4 37 10 22 
vac5p -406 -105 -1,606 -1 0 -2 -14 -1 -88 
a) Includes hobby farms. 
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Figure 4.1a Comparing including or excluding pigs from vaccination in 
2km: distribution of cost amongst the different livestock 
sectors (50% percentile) 
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Figure 4.1b Comparing including or excluding pigs from vaccination in 
2km: distribution of cost amongst the different livestock 
sectors (95% percentile) 
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 Which of the 2-km and 5-km vaccination strategies has the lowest costs ex-
cluding pigs from vaccination depends on the specific DPLA. For Gelderse Vallei 
start in cattle farm the cost related to 5-km vaccination are lower than those re-
lated to 2-km vaccination for the average outcome (-€39m. with 5km versus -
€16m. with 2km compared to culling in 1km) and the pessimistic outcome  
(-€148m. with 5km versus -€44m. with 2km compared to culling in 1km). For 
Oost-Nederland start in cattle farm the vaccination in 5km has higher costs than 
vaccination in 2km in all outcomes. For Gelderse Vallei start in pig farm the vac-
cination in 5km has lower costs than vaccination in 2km in the average outcome 
(-€57m. with 5km versus -€47m. with 2km compared to culling in 1km) and the 
pessimistic outcome (-€141m. with 5km versus -€113m. with 2km compared 
to culling in 1km). 
 For Noord-Brabant start in Pig farm the vaccination in 5km has higher costs 
than vaccination in 2km in the average outcome (-€14m. with 5km versus  
-€35m. with 2km compared to culling in 1km). But for the pessimistic outcome 
the 5km has lower cost (-€88m. with 5km versus -€44m. with 2km compared 
to culling in 1km). 
 Figure 4.2 compares the total cost and its components of the vaccination 
strategie in a 5-km area in Gelderse Vallei start pig farm that include and ex-
clude pigs from vaccination. 
 As can be seen from figure 4.2 the value loss of products of vaccinated ani-
mals is the most important part of the total costs. The 2nd largest costs are the 
operational costs to fight the epidemic. The difference between including and 
excluding pigs is mainly caused by the value loss of products of vaccinated 
animals. The value loss of products of vaccinated animals is discussed in detail 
in paragraph 4.3.3. 
 As can be seen from figure 4.2 the value loss of products of vaccinated 
animals is the most important part of the total costs. The 2nd largest costs are 
the operational costs to fight the epidemic. The difference between including 
and excluding pigs is mainly caused by the value loss of products of vaccinated 
animals. The value loss of products of vaccinated animals is discussed in detail 
in paragraph 4.3.3. 
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Figure 4.2 Cost components of vaccination in 5km in Gelderse Vallei 
start pig farm for vac5 (including pigs in vaccination) or 
vac5p (excluding pigs from vaccination) 
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4.3.2 Alternative strategies: excluding animals on hobby farms from preventive culling 
 
As previous epidemics of contagious diseases have shown, culling animals on 
hobby farms (here small sheep flocks of 10 animals were assumed) lead to a lot 
of protest and resistance from the general public. As described in chapter 2, 
the epidemiological consequences of excluding hobby animals from culling are 
limited. The number of hobby farms that have to be preventively culled is sub-
stantial in the scenarios that only involve culling. The number of hobby farms 
that have to be culled in scenarios that involve vaccination is limited, because 
from the moment vaccination is started preventive culling is stopped. In these 
cases only in the beginning of the epidemic preventive culling is used to limit the 
spread of the epidemic. 
 Table 4.4 shows the costs for culling strategies including and excluding 
hobby farms. The costs of strategies in which hobby farms are not preventively 
culled are in most scenarios lower because the cost for culling hobby farms can 
be avoided. Because of the small number of animals per farm the time taken to 
preventively cull the animals and the related costs per animal are relatively high. 
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Table 4.4 Difference in costs comparing culling on hobby farms (cul1) 
and non-culling on hobby farms (cul1h) 
 Number of culled farms Last week of detection Total cost in million € 
 percentile percentile percentile 
 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Gelderse Vallei start in cattle farm 
cul1 971 206 3217 9 4 15 236 94 615 
cul1h -150 -37 -555 0 0 0 -7 -1 -15 
Oost-Nederland start in cattle farm 
cul1 393 84 1595 6 3 13 110 67 327 
cul1h -74 -16 -314 0 0 0 1 0 -17 
Gelderse Vallei start in pig farm 
cul1 1656 495 3980 9 5 15 334 140 728 
cul1h -273 -76 -700 0 0 0 -2 -2 -15 
Noord-Brabant start in Pig farm 
cul1 579 166 2030 7 4 14 185 98 483 
cul1h -117 -34 -326 0 0 1 1 -2 14 
 
4.3.3 More insight into the value loss of products of vaccinated cattle 
 
In figure 4.3 the value loss for products of the different animal species are 
given. The operational cost are excluded, because these cannot be specifically 
allocated to different species. The results are presented for Noord-Brabant start 
in pig farm with a 2-km and 5-km vaccination strategy in which pigs are ex-
cluded from vaccination. The value loss of products of vaccinated animals is 
almost equally distributed between dairy cows and veal calves. 
 
Milk of vaccinated cows 
A situation, in which vaccination is included in a strategy to control an epidemic 
of FMD, is new for the Dutch dairy industry. In the last FMD epidemic vaccination 
was also implemented, but then the vaccinated animals were culled after the 
epidemic. Now the vaccinated animals stay alive. 
 It is uncertain for the dairy sector what the reaction of the market is when 
confronted with products from vaccinated animals. The amount of milk that has 
to be reallocated because of market restrictions depends not only on the num-
ber of dairy cows that were vaccinated but also on how the market will treat the 
milk of non-vaccinated farms in infected compartments. 
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Figure 4.3 Value loss of products vaccinated cattle per animal type 
(Noord-Brabant start in pig farm, 2-km and 5-km vaccina-
tion, excluding pigs from vaccination, 50% percentile) 
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 The dairy industry indicates that the milk of the vaccinated animals will 
probably be used for cheese production. It is expected that the amount of 
cheese produced from milk of vaccinate cows is such, that all of it can be sold 
within the EU. So, if the retail in the EU accepts this cheese, there will not be 
any value loss for cheese. However, the main value loss occurs because the 
side products of cheese production as whey, butter and buttermilk powder 
cannot be processed in the normal production routine. In the situation without 
an outbreak these side products from different production plants are collected 
and processed in one plant. Due to the increase in scale of the dairy processing 
industry, it is not possible to separate and process these products to create 
normal added value during an epidemic with vaccination as a control strategy. In 
case of vaccination, the dairy industry expects that these products have to be 
considered as waste products with very little value. 
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 Efforts aiming to reduce the costs related to the processing of the milk of 
vaccinated cows into cheese should focus on creating added value of the side 
products of the cheese production. For example using these products at factories 
that produce only for the domestic market or finding alternative use for these 
products such as pig nutrition. Logistic cooperation between dairy companies 
during an epidemic might reduce the logistic costs and also limit the number of 
locations where the milk from vaccinated animals has to be processed, thereby 
further reducing the value loss of milk from vaccinated dairy cows. 
 In case the market will not accept dairy products from regions in which 
animals are vaccinated, a much larger volume of milk has to be processed 
separately. In appendix 3 an indication of the number of infected compartments, 
the number of dairy cows in these compartments, and the amount of milk 
produced daily by cows in these compartments is given. These data suggest 
that in this case the amount of milk produced exceeds the volume that can be 
processed as cheese and other products have to be produced from milk from 
vaccinated dairy cows, like consumption milk and milk powder. This could 
increase the costs substantially. 
 
Veal calves 
On average, there were 615,000 white veal and 230,000 rose veal calves held 
over the years 2005-2006 in the Netherlands. The annual production is 
210,000 tons of veal meat. Of the total Dutch veal production 95% is being 
exported to about 60 countries of which France, Italy and Germany are the most 
important. The veal supply chain is dominated by several large integrated veal 
production companies: VanDrie Group, Alpuro Group, Denkavit and the Pali 
Group. These companies enter into integration contracts with calf farmers, have 
their own factories for calf milk replacement and/or slaughter the calves in their 
own slaughter houses (De Rond, 2008). 
 In a study on the financial damage for veal calve chains De Rond (2008) 
concludes that revenue losses of the vaccinated veal calves are substantial. 
A large part of the damage is related to the fact that many white veal calves will 
be older than 8 months at slaughter at the end of the epidemic. These white 
calves then have to be sold as rose calves against a substantially lower price. 
Also, the carcasses of the vaccinated animals have to be maturated and 
deboned separately, incurring additional costs. 
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 Efforts that aim to reduce the costs related to veal calves should focus on 
shortening the duration of the epidemic. This limits the number of calves older 
than 8 months. Slaughtering of calves during the epidemic, which are likely to 
become older than 8 months before the end of the epidemic, freezing or storing 
their meat to put on specific/domestic markets after the epidemic, can also 
decrease these costs. However, the capacity of these markets to absorb large 
quantities of veal is limited. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the calves 
slaughtered during the epidemic can be sold within the EU after the epidemic. 
 
4.3.4 Summary of the results 
 
In the previous paragraphs the different relevant themes were discussed in 
details. In table 4.5 summarises the costs for each strategy. Whereas in the 
previous paragraphs the costs of the alternatives were compared with a base-
line strategy in table 4.5 the total calculated costs are given. This enables 
evaluation of the strategies on there own merits. As previously, for all strategies 
a large difference in costs between the optimistic, average and pessimistic 
results can be observed. 
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Table 4.5 Summary table with the total costs of the different strategies 
discussed in the previous paragraphs 
 Number of culled farms Last week of detection Total cost in million € 
 percentile percentile percentile 
 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Friesland start in cattle farm 
cul1  56 2 295 3 1 8 61 48 109 
vac2  30 2 117 3 1 8 61 48 108 
vac5 30 2 113 3 1 6 65 48 121 
Gelderse Vallei start in cattle farm 
cul1 971 206 3,217 9 4 15 236 94 615 
cul1h 821 169 2,662 9 4 15 229 93 600 
vac2 260 70 707 10 5 17 227 99 526 
vac2p 268 71 791 11 5 20 220 95 571 
vac2h 236 63 643 10 5 17 230 98 525 
vac5 230 68 571 6 4 11 228 106 504 
vac5p 234 68 598 7 4 13 197 98 467 
vac5h 206 61 509 6 4 11 230 109 502 
Oost-Nederland start in cattle farm 
cul1 393 84 1,595 6 3 13 110 67 327 
cul1h 319 68 1,281 6 3 13 110 67 309 
vac2 136 36 469 7 3 16 119 62 315 
vac2p 136 36 473 7 3 16 106 60 239 
vac2h 116 31 424 7 3 16 119 62 319 
vac5 132 36 407 6 3 10 146 69 355 
vac5p 131 37 406 5 3 10 128 68 271 
vac5h 112 31 360 6 3 11 146 69 361 
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Table 4.5 Summary table with the total costs of the different strategies 
discussed in the previous paragraphs (continued) 
 Number of culled farms Last week of detection Total cost in million € 
 percentile percentile percentile 
 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Gelderse Vallei start in pig farm 
cul1 1656 495 3980 9 5 15 334 140 728 
cul1h 1383 419 3280 9 5 15 331 138 712 
vac2 506 170 1109 10 6 16 302 141 597 
vac2p 516 170 1175 11 6 19 287 132 615 
vac2h 455 148 997 10 6 16 305 140 603 
vac5 464 163 970 7 4 11 325 154 653 
vac5p 467 163 998 7 5 13 276 138 586 
vac5h 409 143 861 7 5 11 323 160 647 
Noord-Brabant start in Pig farm 
cul1 579 166 2030 7 4 14 185 98 483 
cul1h 462 132 1704 7 4 15 187 97 497 
vac2 180 61 499 7 4 16 169 95 452 
vac2p 181 61 538 7 4 18 150 89 439 
vac2h 153 53 450 8 4 16 177 94 462 
vac5 174 60 415 6 3 10 222 108 505 
vac5p 173 61 424 6 4 12 171 98 395 
vac5h 144 52 355 6 3 11 222 109 514 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
Model study 
The results presented here are derived with the help of models. Models are fre-
quently used to calculate the consequences of different control strategy scenar-
ios. These models contain the most recent scientific insights into the spread of 
the disease and the effects of control strategies. However, some input data for 
the current situation in the Netherlands were not available, because the Nether-
lands only suffered incidental epidemics of FMD. These input data were based 
on reasoned assumptions. Furthermore, some input data (like the between-herd 
transmission) were only available for virus strain O/NET/2001. The results 
should thus be seen as an arbitrary but reasonable estimate of the effects of 
control strategies, given these limiting conditions. The results provide an esti-
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mate of the differences between the scenarios. The resulting insight provide a 
basis for the discussion about the optimal control strategy for FMD in the Neth-
erlands. 
 Estimated costs of all the evaluated strategies in this study were lower than 
the total reported costs of the last epidemic in the Netherlands, which only in-
volved 26 detected farms. This is because in the Partial Budget method used in 
this study only the costs that differ between the control strategies were included 
and not the total costs. For example, costs related to tourism and those that 
depend on an epidemic per se, irrespective of the control strategy, were not in-
cluded in the costs calculated in this study.1 
 It is difficult to predict the effect of a specific FMD introduction in the Nether-
lands. Events with a random character play an important role at the start and 
during an epidemic. In the epidemiological model probability is used to model 
this. Due to chance there is a wide variety of possible outcomes. Using multiple 
model runs provides insight into this variation. It is assumed that an actual epi-
demic will behave like one of the simulated epidemics. 
 Interpretation of the economic results depends on the risk attitude of the 
decision maker. A risk-neutral decision maker is assumed to choose a strategy 
that on average has the lowest costs. A risk-averse decision maker is assumed 
to base the decision on the minimising the chance on unpleasant outcomes 
(Hardaker et al., 1997). To support the risk neutral decision maker we pre-
sented the 50% percentile of the costs. This means that 50% of the simulated 
epidemics have calculated costs that are less or equal than the presented num-
ber. To support the risk-averse decision maker we presented the 95% percentile 
of the costs. This means that 95% of the simulated epidemics have calculated 
costs that are less or equal than the presented number. Only in 5% of the simu-
lated outcomes the costs are higher. 
 A specific feature of the used simulation method is that at the start of the 
epidemic a decision on how to fight the epidemic is taken, and the decision 
maker sticks to this decision during the epidemic. This often is not what actual 
happens during an epidemic. In reality, it is a process of monitoring and adapt-
ing the control strategy based on a series of decisions rather than on one deci-
sion. Or, as Ge (2008) puts it: 'The epidemic can only be understood 
backwards, but it must be controlled forward.' 
                                                
1 The costs for tourism are difficult to predict since they depend on (a) the location of the outbreak 
(the tourist industry at the Veluwe in the Gelderse Vallei is more important than in the Peel in Eastern 
Brabant) and (b) the viewpoint of the analyst (for example are only the effects for the local industry 
considered or the effects for the Dutch tourist sector as a whole. Part of the tourists might spend 
their holidays later or elsewhere in the Netherlands which shows effects locally but not nationally). 
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 The economic results suggest that several control measures themselves in-
cur high costs. For example vaccinating in a circle of 5km around a detected 
farm results in high numbers of vaccinated animals and large amounts of prod-
ucts of vaccinated animals that have to be processed. A decision maker can 
decide on control strategy with measures with relatively low costs at the start of 
an epidemic, while he/she can take additional costly measures during the epi-
demic in case it is about to explode. This might result in a more economically 
efficient control than an instant massive response at the start of an epidemic. 
This means that measures which have an irreversible effect and a large impact, 
e.g. culling or vaccinating a large number of animals, should be taken cautiously 
but timely. To be able to take such a dynamic decision, decision makers have to 
predefine what kind of information they need at what moment in the decision 
process, so that efforts can be made to collect this information at the right 
moments during the epidemic. Furthermore, control measures should be im-
plemented in a 'smart' way. For example, when it is decided to vaccinate one 
could start with a circle of 2km and if needed expand this circle to 5km instead 
of starting at the border of the 5km zone and than working to the centre. 
 In addition to the direct costs of the epidemic for the primary producers rip-
ple effects and spill over effects can be observed during an epidemic. Ripple ef-
fects are the effects of an epidemic of FMD that are felt upstream and 
downstream along the livestock value chain-breeding, feed production, input 
supply, slaughter, processing, final sale and consumption. For example, the 
stand-still measures in infected compartments prevent the slaughter of animals 
for a period of at least six weeks. Especially when multiple compartments are 
affected, this can seriously affect the supply of slaughterhouses. In previous 
epidemics of FMD in the Netherlands this caused a temporarily stop in the pro-
duction of slaughterhouses. This problem is especially prevalent for slaughter-
houses for veal calves. For the pig industry it might be a somewhat different 
picture, because currently a large amount of slaughter pigs are exported to be 
slaughtered outside the country. In case of an epidemic live export of slaughter 
animals will not be possible. The additional supply of pigs that now have to be 
slaughtered within the Netherlands might compensate the stagnating supply 
from the infected compartments. 
 Due to an epidemic the market access for products of susceptible species 
is seriously restricted. An epidemic of FMD will result in trade restrictions that 
are related to the epidemic per se and do not depend on the specific character-
istics of the control strategy chosen. After the last outbreak it takes time until all 
the restrictions in trade are removed and the situation regarding export of ani-
mals and products is back tot the situation before the initial outbreak. Especially 
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for the Dutch pig sector, an epidemic of FMD can have high consequences, be-
cause of the export of large numbers of live pigs. These pigs must then be sold 
in the Netherlands. It can therefore be expected that prices in the areas af-
fected by restrictions will fall. 
 Spill-over effects are the effects of an epidemic of FMD on non-agricultural 
sectors as tourism and other services. Because non-agricultural production is 
increasingly important for the rural economy, these spill-over effect are likely to 
become a an increasingly important part of the total epidemic costs. 
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
 
 
In this research the epidemiological and economic consequences of different 
control strategies evaluated. Therefore the following research questions are  
addressed: 
1. What is the optimal control strategy in case of an outbreak of FMD from an 
epidemiological and economic perspective? Evaluated are the control strat-
egy as required by the EU, culling within a 1-km ring, and vaccination within 
2-km or 5-km rings around detected farms. 
2. What are the consequences of alternative strategies? 
a. excluding pigs from vaccination; 
b. excluding animals on hobby farms from preemptive culling. 
3. What are the consequences for screening and declaring freedom of infection 
when different control strategies that include vaccination are applied? 
4. What is the distribution of costs between animal species and cost types? 
5. What is the lost value of products of vaccinated animals? 
 
 In this chapter the research results will be discussed and conclusions will be 
drawn. 
 
 
5.1 The epidemiology of FMD 
 
Method 
To study the effect of differentiated strategies to control Foot-and-Mouth Dis-
ease (FMD) epidemics, we developed a model that describes the transmission 
of FMD between animals and between farms. The model parameters are based 
on data from transmission experiments and from the 2001 FMD epidemic in the 
Netherlands (with virus strain O/NET/2001), or assumptions were made when 
insufficient information was available (such as interspecies transmission). The 
most important assumptions are about the relative susceptibility and infectivity 
of cattle-, sheep-, pig- and hobby farms, in this study estimated for the virus 
strain O/Net/2001. Extrapolation of the results to different virus strains (like pig 
strains if they exist) should be done with caution. With this model large numbers 
of hypothetical epidemics were simulated, starting in different areas in the 
Netherlands, either on a cattle or a pig farm. 
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Results for high farm density 
In general, the larger an epidemic can become, the larger the effect of control 
is and the larger the differences between control strategies are. Potentially 
large epidemics occur for instance in areas with a high farm density. For this 
reason we will focus on the results of the simulated epidemics in the highest 
density area, the Gelderse Vallei (with about 4 commercial farms per km2), 
where the epidemic starts in a cattle farm. When 1-km ring culling is applied, the 
median number (and 5%-95% percentiles) of detected farms is 45 (17-97), over 
a period of 67 (30-124) days. In this scenario the number of culled farms is 974 
(342-1870), which compares to a total number of farms in the Gelderse Vallei of 
around 4000. Vaccination is less effective in the beginning of an epidemic than 
culling, as vaccinated animals are not instantaneously protected. In order to try 
and achieve the same effect as a given ring culling strategy, vaccination may be 
applied in larger rings. A 2-km vaccination strategy (with 72 (23-162) detected 
farms, lasting 76 (41-133) days) does not measure up to 1-km culling, but the 
epidemic impact (detected and preemptively culled farms) is much smaller. The 
5-km vaccination strategy yields the smallest epidemic size (43 (19-89) de-
tected farms) and duration (52 (34-91) days). It should be kept in mind though 
that the vaccination capacity needed in the 5-km vaccination strategy will most 
probably become limiting in more than halve of the epidemics (with 149 (0-800) 
farms to be vaccinated per day in the first week of the vaccination campaign). 
 
Results for low farm density 
In areas with a lower farm density, epidemics are predicted to be much smaller. 
In the lowest density area, Friesland (with about 2 commercial farms per km2), 
control measures of preemptively culling or vaccinating farms in the neighbour-
hood are even unnecessary. Instead, the minimal control strategy as required 
by the EU suffices. 
 
Affected farms 
In all cattle dense areas about 80-90% of the infected farms are cattle farms. 
Even in a pig dense area as Noord-Brabant (de Peel), when the virus is intro-
duced on a pig farm, approximately 75% of the infected farms are cattle farms 
and only 10% are pig farms. This is caused by the much higher number of cattle 
farms in the country (36,000) compared to pig farms (9,000), even in Noord-
Brabant. Furthermore, these results are caused by the relative susceptibility and 
infectivity of cattle-, sheep-, pig- and hobby farms estimated in this study for the 
virus strain O/Net/2001. Extrapolation of the results to different virus strains 
(like pig strains if they exist) should be done with caution. 
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 In most areas commercial sheep farms (18000) comprise around 10% of the 
detected farms while the share of hobby farms (20000 in this study) never ex-
ceeds 4%. 
 
Undetected farms 
The number of infected farms that is not clinically detected during the epidemic 
(before the end screening) differs greatly between strategies: for the minimal 
strategy around 9% of the infected farms is not detected, while this percentage 
is 4%-7% for 1-km culling, 11%-18% for 2-km vaccination and 12%-20% for 5-km 
vaccination. For the non-vaccination strategies these undetected farms are 
mostly sheep farms, but for the vaccination strategies they are mostly vacci-
nated cattle farms. 
 
Excluding hobby farms from preemptive culling 
Under our model assumptions, excluding hobby farms (here small sheep flocks 
of 10 animals) from preemptive culling has a negligible effect on epidemic con-
trol. When hobby farms are excluded from preemptive culling, the number of 
farms to be culled in the 1-km culling strategy reduces with 20%, but the num-
ber of animals to be culled is only 3% smaller. 
Excluding pig farms from vaccination 
Not vaccinating pig farms in the 2 or 5-km vaccination zones, has a limited but 
significant effect on epidemic size and duration (for the virus strain O/Net/2001 
under study). The median values are hardly affected, but the 95% percentiles 
are considerably larger, indicating an increased risk of large epidemics. 
Whether these differences are sufficiently small for the benefits of excluding pig 
farms from vaccination to compensate for the increased risk, is evaluated in the 
economical analysis. 
 
 
5.2 Freedom of infection 
 
EU end-screening strategy 
According to the EU legislation all animals on all vaccinated farms must be sero-
logically tested after the epidemic. Of the unvaccinated farms in the protection 
zone (3km), all sheep farms have to be visited, and a 5/95 sample of animals 
must be taken. Of the unvaccinated farms in the surveillance zone (3-10km), a 
2/95 sample of sheep farms must be tested, and of each visited farm a sample 
of 5/95 animals must be taken. 
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 The end screening as required by the EU results in 16,000-23,000 farms 
(5%-95% percentiles) to be tested when the minimal strategy is applied, 1,000-
5,000 farms when 1-km culling is applied and 2,000-11,000 farms when 2-km 
or 5-km vaccination is applied. About half of these farms must be retested to 
exclude or confirm infection. 
 
Number of seropositive animals before end screening 
Before the end screening, a number of seropositive animals are still present on 
infected herds that were not detected during the epidemic (seropositive for non 
structural FMD proteins, as detected by an NS Elisa). The minimal strategy 
yields 767 (466-1090) seropositive animals per epidemic, ring culling in 1-km 
yields 8 (0-42) seropositive animals per epidemic, while 2-km ring vaccination 
results in 50 (7-148) seropositive animals and 5-km ring vaccination in 35 (6-99) 
seropositive animals per epidemic. The 2-km ring vaccination strategy yields 
more seropositive animals than 5-km ring vaccination, because it is a less effec-
tive strategy, leading to larger and longer epidemics. 
 
Risk of seropositive animals after end screening 
Even with the most stringent end-screening strategy, the serological tests are 
never 100% sensitive and thus there is always a (small) chance that seropositive 
animals are missed during the end screening. When these seropositive animals 
are exported after the country has been declared free of infection, and detected 
by an importing country, they pose a serious threat to the export position of the 
Netherlands. Another threat is, of course, the risk of new outbreaks, if they still 
carry virus, after the end-screening according to the EU legislation, 1.0 (0.0-9.2) 
seropositive animals remain using the 1-km culling strategy, 3.5 (0.3-14.8) us-
ing the 2-km vaccination strategy and 2.1 (0.3-9.4) using the 5-km vaccination 
strategy. Although the median values differ, the ranges are comparable. When 
these numbers of seropositive animals are considered to represent an accept-
able risk, emergency vaccination would be a safe alternative to preemptive cull-
ing. 
 
Alternative screening strategies 
The seropositive animals present before end screening are mainly vaccinated 
cattle, vaccinated sheep and non-vaccinated sheep (and not pigs or unvacci-
nated cattle). As these groups of animals are already targeted in the EU-
screening strategy, there is little potential for increasing the detection rate by 
using more stringent screening strategy. When, as an alternative to the EU legis-
lation, unvaccinated cattle and pigs are tested, the results of the end screening 
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are not affected. So, this increased sampling effort on unvaccinated cattle and 
pig farms does not decrease the risk of seropositive animals. Another alterna-
tive is to take a 5/95 sample of vaccinated pigs (instead of testing all). Accord-
ing to the model results, this halves the total number of animals to be tested, 
but the end-screening results hardly change. So, this reduced sampling effort on 
vaccinated pig farms does not increase the risk of seropositive animals. 
 
 
5.3 Economic consequences 
 
What is the optimal strategy: culling, 2-km or 5-km vaccination? 
 
- Culling strategy is the economically preferred strategy in SPLAs. 
- Vaccination is the economically preferred strategy in DPLAs. 
- In DPLAs with very high densities of livestock vaccination in 5km around de-
tected farms results in the lowest costs whereas in other DPLAs vaccination 
in 2km around detected farms results in the lowest costs. 
 
Alternative strategies: excluding pigs from vaccination and excluding animals on 
hobby farms from preventive culling 
 
When vaccination is chosen as strategy in DPLA regions, excluding pigs from 
vaccination should be seriously considered since there is a relevant reduction 
in costs. This result is caused by the relative susceptibility and infectivity of cat-
tle-, sheep-, pig- and hobby farms estimated in this study for the virus strain 
O/Net/2001. Extrapolation of the results to different virus strains (like pig 
strains if they exist) should be done with caution. 
Abolishing preventive culling of animals on hobby farms (here small sheep 
flocks of 10 animals) should seriously be considered. Preventive culling of ani-
mals on hobby farms does not attribute much to a faster elimination of the epi-
demic but contributes a lot to the negative perception of the public towards the 
needed interventions. Excluding animals on hobby farms from preventive culling 
does not substantially affect the costs of an epidemic but it improves the socie-
tal acceptance of the eradication strategies. 
 
Distribution of costs 
 
The dairy industry, veal calve industry and the pig industry all suffer a lot from 
an epidemic of FMD. Although vaccination can limit the costs of an epidemic it 
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also introduces the potential problem of reduced market access for products of 
vaccinated animals. 
For the dairy industry a large part of the costs originate from the inability to 
create value from side products of the processing of milk of vaccinated cows. 
For the veal calve industry the highest costs originate from animals getting 
older than eight months at slaughter during an epidemic, so that their meat 
cannot be sold as white veal. 
For the pig industry the highest costs originate from the reduced market ac-
ceptance of animals and their products from infected compartments by (interna-
tional) trade partners. 
 
Value loss due to vaccination 
 
Market acceptance by the trade partners of products originating from vacci-
nated animals might cushion the economic effects of an epidemic. An integrated 
effort of the government and the livestock industry to limit the consequences of 
an epidemic of FMD to inform the trade partners about the Dutch approach to 
fight the disease is needed. 
A coordinated action between the relevant stakeholders during an epidemic 
can reduce the value loss of milk from vaccinated dairy cows. Logistic coopera-
tion between dairy companies can reduce the logistic costs and limit the num-
ber of locations where the milk from vaccinated animals has to be processed. 
Initiate consultations with the trade partners on the market acceptance of prod-
ucts from vaccinated animals. 
Insight into ways to reduce the value loss of products of vaccinated animals 
with a focus on cattle (dairy products and veal calves) is needed to decrease 
the potential costs of a vaccination strategy to eradicate a FMD epidemic. 
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Appendix 1 
Results of within-herd model 
 
 
To illustrate the effects of the within-herd model, outbreaks are simulated at dif-
ferent infection-vaccination intervals for three model farms that consist of 
100 cattle, 100 sheep and 1,000 pigs. In the final simulations, real farm data 
(i.e. actual farm location and number of animals) will be used. For each animal 
type (cattle, sheep/goats, pigs) and each infection-vaccination interval 10,000 
simulations are run. The results are shown in figures A.1 and A.2 and discussed 
below. 
 
Fraction of outbreaks detected 
 
First it is examined how many of the 10,000 simulated outbreaks are detected 
as a function of the vaccination time. When an outbreak is not detected, this is 
either because the first animal to be infected is already protected by the vac-
cine or because the outbreak is so small that the number of clinical cases stays 
below the detection limit. 
 For cattle the fraction of detected outbreaks decreases rapidly when the 
herd is infected between 1 and 8 days after vaccination (see figure A1.1). The 
fraction of detected outbreaks for pigs shows the same trend, but it is shifted to 
later infection times, because the vaccine takes more time to build immunity. 
So, cattle and pig farms need to be vaccinated well in advance of infection for 
the vaccine to have an effect. For sheep and goats on the other hand, the 
model predicts that the vaccine has an effect even when the herd is vaccinated 
after it has already been infected. This is because the vaccine works reasonably 
fast, while the infection progresses relatively slowly (compared to cattle and 
pigs), giving the sheep more time to develop immunity. 
 Even for unvaccinated farms (at an infection-vaccination interval -21 days, or, 
equivalently, infection takes place 21 days before vaccination) not all outbreaks 
are detected. For cattle and pigs this only happens when the first infected ani-
mal has such a short infectious period that it does not manage to transmit the 
virus; this occurs in less than 1% of the outbreaks. For sheep it is also possible 
that the infection spreads gradually over the herd and eventually dies out with-
out ever reaching the detection limit of 6 clinical cases, because of the low re-
production number, the high detection limit and the high percentage of 
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subclinical infections. Such an undetected outbreak can have affected a consid-
erable fraction of the total herd. In our model farm of 100 sheep 14% of the out-
breaks are not detected; for the real sheep farm data (largely consisting of 
small farms) however, this percentage can be as high as 72%, according to the 
model. 
 
Clinical detection time 
 
Suspicion arises when the detection limit of clinical cases is reached; detection 
follows the day after. Unvaccinated infected cattle farms are detected 9.0 (7.1-
11.4) days after infection, sheep and goats farms after 23 (15.6-31.5) days and 
pig farms after 8.1 (6.7-9.9) days (see most negative infection-vaccination inter-
vals in figure A1.1). For vaccinated farms the clinical detection time for cattle 
and pigs is a bit longer than for unvaccinated farms, suggesting that if the first 
infected animal manages to infect others, it takes more time to reach the clini-
cal detection limit. For vaccinated sheep and goats farms we observe an oppo-
site effect: the detection time of vaccinated sheep farms is shorter than for 
unvaccinated farms. Due to the different infection dynamics, only fast propagat-
ing infections in sheep farms manage to reach the detection limit. 
 
Number of affected animals at time of clinical detection 
 
The number of affected animals at the time of clinical detection comprises all 
animals that have contributed to the total infection pressure (meaning all I and R 
animals). For unvaccinated farms the number of affected animals at the time of 
clinical detection is 20 (9-36) for cattle, 26 (13-43) for sheep/goats and 100 
(55-157) for pigs (see most negative infection-vaccination intervals in figure 
A.2). Around 10%-30% of the farm animals are affected at the time of clinical 
detection. For vaccinated farms the number of affected animals is much lower. 
 
Number of affected animals at the end of an undetected outbreak 
 
The outbreaks that are not detected affect a small number of animals. Figure 
A1.2 shows that the number to be expected will be reasonably small for cattle, 
but could be considerable for sheep/goats and pigs. Although these undetected 
outbreaks will play a smaller role in the between-herd transmission, most of 
them need to be detected during the end screening. 
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Appendix 2 
Data and assumptions used for the economic evaluation 
 
 
Distribution between animal types 
source: CBS Statline; year: 2005 
 
cattle dairy cows   37.7% 
 young stock   29.4% 
 veal calves   21.8% 
 other cattle   11.0% 
      
pigs sows (including piglets)  8.4% 
 fattening pigs   48.7% 
      
sheep ewe (including lambs)  100.0%  
hobby ewe (including lambs)  100.0% 
 
This figure is the national average. In the different strategies the specific re-
gional distribution is used. 
 
Value of culled animals and destructed feed and milk 
source: price: valuetables d.d. May 2008 
source: feed: Meuwissen, 2004 (pg 13, table 8) 
 
  price feed  
cattle dairy cows €759/animal €44.00/animal 
(of which milk: 1,5 day x 23 kg melk per cow per day x 31 cents per kg milk = 
€ 10,70 per cow) 
 young stock €577/animal €-  /animal 
 veal calves €411/animal €26.00/animal 
 other cattle €759/animal €33.30/animal 
(dairy: excluding destructed milk) 
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sheep ewe (including lambs) €73/animal €1.60/animal 
      
pigs sows (including piglets) €522/animal €33.00/animal 
 fattening pigs €77/animal €3.70/animal 
      
hobby, sheep ewe (including lambs)  €73/animal €1.60/animal 
 
Value loss of vaccinated animals (sold in the Netherlands) 
 
cattle dairy cows €410/vaccinated animal 
 
explanation: 
production of milk per cow per year (source: LEI): 7,940 kg, which equals 
21.8 kg per cow per day 
value loss of milk of vaccinated cows: 180 days x 21.8 kg milk per cow per day 
x value loss of €82.50 euro per 1,000 kg milk = €323 per dairy cow 
plus logistic processing and separate transport of milk of vaccinated cows: 
180 days x 21.8 kg milk per cow per day x costs of separate transport of milk 
€15.50 euro per 1,000 kg milk = €61 per dairy cow 
plus 28% replacement per year (KWIN pg 161) x 180 days x €525 revenues 
per cow for slaughtering (KWIN 2007/2008, pg 162) x value loss (estimation) 
35% = €26 per dairy cow 
 
young stock €5/vaccinated animal 
 
explanation:  
6% of young stock sold per year (KWIN, pg 161; concerning young stock  
1-2 year) x 0.5 year x €500 (KWIN pg 162; concerning young stock 2 year,  
O3-quality) x value loss (estimation) 35% = € 5.25 per young stock 
 
veal calves €450/vaccinated animal 
 
explanation: 
142 slaughter weight per calf (KWIN, pg 220; concerning white veal calves) x 
€4.60 per kg x 74% value loss (De Rond, 2008; pg 30, table 17) = €483.37 
per veal calf 
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190 kg slaughter weight per calf (KWIN, pg 221; concerning rosé veal calves) x 
€2.79 per kg x 55% value loss (De Rond, 2008; pg 30 table 17) = €291.55 
per veal calf 
With 558,000 white veal calves and 118,000 rosé veal calves in 2006 
(Bont et al., 2007, LEI report 6.07.16) the average value loss per veal calf is: 
€ 449.89. 
  
other cattle €26/vaccinated animal 
 
Assumption same value loss as slaughtered dairy cows: € 25.73 per animal 
 
sheep ewe (including lambs) €34/vaccinated animal 
 
explanation: 
revenues of Flevolanders per ewe per year = € 193,41 (KWIN, pg 238). This is 
for half a year: € 96,71. Estimated value loss 35%: € 33.85 per ewe (including 
lambs). 
   
pigs sows (including piglets) €262/vaccinated animal  
 
explanation:  
value loss of sows = 37% replacement per year x 0.5 year x € 152 per sow x 
estimated 35% lower revenues: € 9.84 per sow 
plus value loss of piglets = 5.6 piglets present per sow present x € 45 value 
loss per piglet (LEI-report 5.07.06, pg 134/135) = € 252 per sow. 
Total value loss: € 261.81 per sow. 
 
fattening pigs €40/vaccinated animal   
 
explanation: 
revenues per slaughtered pig = € 113.80 (KWIN, pg 287) x estimated 35% 
lower revenues = € 39.83 per fattening pig. 
 
hobby, sheep ewe (including lambs) €0/vaccinated animal 
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Costs of logistic slaughtering of vaccinated animals (after 30 days after last de-
tection) 
source: Meuwissen, 2004 
 
cattle veal calves €14/vaccinated animal 
growth period veal calves 190 days 
    
pigs fattening pigs €9/vaccinated animal 
growth period fattening pigs 120 days 
 
sheep sheep €4/vaccinated animal 
growth period sheep 365 days 
 
Costs of empty houses of non-infected farms in infected compartments 
 
growth period veal calves 190  
 
Market and export losses 
 
costs of storage: €154 per tonne per 6 months (Bergevoet et al., Oct. 2007; 
pg 123) 
this means: costs of storage  €/kg/day  0.000843836 (= 154/1000/ 
182.5 days) 
 
Fase:  
1) during epidemic (1st detection to last detection + 30 days); 
2) after epidemic (last detection + 30 days to FMD-free declaration): 
- without vaccination and living duration 60 days (excl. 30 days after last 
detection); 
- vaccination and living duration 150 days (excluding 30 days after last de-
tection). 
 
Products: 
- live animals; 
- meat and meat products; 
- milk and milk products. 
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Variants: 
- no export (all exports in storage); 
- exports possible to EU-memberstates (only storage of exports to third 
countries); 
- exports possible to EU- + third countries (no storage needed). 
 
Number of animals  
(source: Land- en Tuinbouwcijfers; 2006) 
 
Dairy cows 1,420,000
Young stock 1,314,000
Veal calves 844,000
Other cattle 168,000
Sheep (ewe) 648,000
Pigs (sows) 946,000
Fatteners 5,476,000
 
Live animals 
 
Export losses due to export limitations are mainly concerning piglets. 
Exports in 2006: 4,915,481 pigs.1 Source: ZMP Vieh und Fleisch 2007 
(pg 147). 
Number of fattening pigs in the Netherlands is 5.476.000. Source: Land- en 
Tuinbouwcijfers, LEI/CBS, 2006. 
This means: export of 0.90 live animals per fattening pig per year, which 
equals 0.0025 live animals per fattening pig per day. Assumed these are all pig-
lets with a value of €45 per piglet and a reduction of value of an estimated 
75%. 
Assumptions export loss of piglets: 
>> exports: 0.0025 animals per fattening pig per day; 
>> no exports: 0.0025 animals per fattening pig per day x €45 x 75%; 
>> exports possible within EU: no export losses. 
 
                                                
1 Exports of live pigs in the report of Hoogendam (2008; titled 'Long distance transport of pigs, bo-
vines and poultry in Europe'): 8.068.792 pigs, of which to Germany (DE): 5.590.085, to Italy (IT): 
548.384, to Belgium (BE): 703.011, to Spain (ES): 1.227.312 
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NOTE: For the other animal categories the export problems of live animals are 
limited and therefore not included in the calculations. 
 
Sheep 
 
Exports: 329,627 animals; 12,314 tonnes product weight in 2006 (total), of 
which 479 tonnes (= 4%) to third countries. Source: ZMP Vieh und Fleisch, 
2007. 
Assumptions for sheep: 
>> exports: 19 kg per ewe per year that is 0.052 kg per ewe per day; 
>> no exports: 0.052 kg per day x costs of storage per kg; 
>> exports possible within EU: 0.052 kg per day x 4% (perc. non-EU) x costs 
of storage per kg. 
 
Pigs 
 
Exports: 921,750 tonnes product weight in 2006 (total), of which 172,908 ton-
nes (= 19%) to third countries. Source: ZMP Vieh und Fleisch 2007. 
Assumptions for pigs: 
>> exports: 168 kg per fattening pig per year that is 0,46 kg per fattening pig 
per day; 
>> no exports: 0.46 kg per pig per day x costs of storage per kg; 
>> export EU: 0.46 kg per pig per day x 19% (perc. non-EU) x costs of storage 
per kg; 
Export losses for sows are assumed to be negligible. 
 
Veal calves 
 
Exports: 188,000 tonnes of veal, of which 29,000 tonnes (= 15%) to 'others' 
(assumed: 'non-EU'). Source: report E.H.M. de Rond, 2008. 
Assumptions for veal calves: 
>> exports: 222 kg per veal calf per year that is 0,61 kg per veal calf per day; 
>> no exports: 0,61 kg per calf per day x costs of storage per kg; 
>> exports possible within EU: 0,61 kg per calf per day x 15% (perc. non-EU) x 
costs of storage per kg. 
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Other cattle 
 
Exports: 394,887 tonnes -/- 188,000 tonnes of veal = 206,887 tonnes in total, 
of which estimated 15% to third countries (assumed to be equal to veal calves; 
this would mean 31,033 tonnes to third countries). Source: ZMP Vieh und 
Fleisch 2007. 
Assumptions other cattle: 
>> exports: 1,231 kg per other cattle per year that is 3,37 kg per other cattle 
per day; 
>> no exports: 3.37 kg per animal per day x costs of storage per kg; 
>> exports possible within EU: 3.37 kg per animal per day x 15% (estimated 
perc. non-EU) x costs of storage per kg. 
 
Indirect costs farmer 
 
1) Costs of empty housing at infected farms 
 
number of weeks standstill after last detection: 4.285714286 weeks 
(=30 days) 
gross margin (saldo, source: KWIN Veehouderij 2007/2008): 
cattle dairy cows €5.27/day (€1,925 per cow per year;  
   KWIN pg 187)  
 young stock €-/day (included in gross margin of  
   dairy cows)  
 veal calves €0.13day 
(558 x gross margin white veal calves + 118 x gross margin rosé veal calves)/ 
676; KWIN, pg 220 and pg 221: €47 per calf place per year; that is €0.13 per 
calf per day) 
 
other cattle  €0.07/day 
(143 x €6 per suckling cow per year; KWIN, pg 228; 214 x €41 per beef cattle 
per year; KWIN, pg 210; that is €0.074 per other cattle per day) 
  
sheep ewe (including lambs) €0.26/day 
 
pigs sows (including piglets) €0.96/day    
 fattening pigs €0.18/day    
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2) Costs of transportation prohibition non-infected farms: not being able to de-
liver animals during 6 weeks. Source: Huirne et al., 2002; pg 152, table 4.8. 
 
animal  type      
cattle dairy cows €5.46/animal (= 0.13 per cow per day x 
    42 days) 
 young stock €-/animal (included in costs dairy cows) 
 veal calves €10.08/animal (= 0.24 per calf per day  
   x 42 days) 
 other cattle €-/animal 
 
sheep ewe (including lambs) €1.68/animal  
 
pigs sows (including piglets) €17.64/animal 
 fattening pigs €2.10/animal     
 
hobby farm ewe (including lambs) €-/animal   
3) Costs of repopulation of infected farms 
 
Assumption for repopulation of cattle farms: gross margin per animal per day 
during half of the production period; dairy and sows: assumption gross margin 
per animal per day during 3 months. 
 
animal  type    
cattle dairy cows €480/animal (91 days x €5.27/day) 
 young stock €- /animal 
 veal calves €13/animal (1/2 x 200 days x  
    €0.13/day) 
 other cattle €7/animal (1/2 x 200 days x €0.07/day) 
 
sheep ewe (including lambs) €26/animal 
 
pigs sows (including piglets) €87/animal (91 days x €0.96/day) 
 fattening pigs €11/animal (1/2 x 120 days x   
    €0.18/day) 
 
hobby farm ewe (including lambs) €0/animal 
 
 
154 
Control system costs 
 
1) costs of culling + desinfection (source: Huirne et al., Nov. 2002; pg 152,  
table 4.8)    
 
animal  type    
cattle dairy cows €1.000/animal 
(= including young stock, see Huirne et al; Meuwissen, 2004 however calculates 
with € 1.000 per piece of young stock) 
 young stock €0/animal 
 veal calves €150/animal 
 other cattle €1,000/animal 
    
sheep ewe (including lambs) €100/animal 
    
pigs sows (including piglets) €400/animal 
 fattening pigs €150/animal 
    
2) costs of vaccinating (source: Meuwissen, 2004; pg 13, table 8) 
 
animal  type    
cattle dairy cows €8,80/animal 
 young stock €8,80/animal 
 veal calves €2,60/animal 
 other cattle €8,80/animal 
 
sheep ewe (including lambs) €2,60/animal 
 
pigs sows (including piglets) €7,20/animal 
 fattening pigs €1,80/animal 
 
Operational costs of disease control 
 
Huirne et al. (Nov. 2002) states that the outbreak of FMD in 2001 costed the 
Dutch government approximately €142m., the joint agribusiness (animal health 
fund, DGF) also €142m. and the EU €90m. Total: €374m. These are the total 
costs of the FMD-outbreak including compensation and buying up. 
Assumption is that 23% of the total costs concern direct costs of control 
and enforcement, according to the report of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, 
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Nature and Food Quality (report 'MKZ 2001 Eindverantwoording', appendix 2; 
Jan. 2003). This means that these direct costs amount to €86m. 
Next assumption is that approximately half of these direct costs will be fixed 
costs, that means the part that is not depending on the length of the outbreak, 
and half of the costs will be variable costs. Based on this assumption a fixed 
sum of €43m. has been calculated plus a sum of €3m. per week. The duration 
of the outbreak in 2001 was 14 weeks. 
 Direct costs of control and enforcement, derived from the ANFQ-report 
(2003): 
-  realisation costs of sampling at suspected farms: 13.6 (mln NLG); 
-  destruction including transport: 23.7; 
-  realisation costs of screening: 11.2; 
-  material costs (if not mentioned before): 34.3; 
-  costs of RVV: 18.1; 
-  costs of hired workers (if not mentioned before): approximately 15.0 (of 
a total of 52.8); 
-  realisation costs of LASER (if not mentioned before): 11.8; 
-  costs LNV (if not mentioned before): 12.2; 
Total: 139.9 mln NLG (of a total of 609.6 mln; that is 23%). 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Table A3.1 Number of cattle and daily milk production in the infected 
compartments 
# Infected com-
partments 
Total # cows in 
inf. comp. 
(* 1,000) 
Milk production  
per day 
(in M kg) 
percentile percentile percentile 
Province Start  
in 
5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 
vaccination in 2km 
Gelderland cattle 3 7 12 168 386 651 3.5 8.1 13.7 
Overijssel cattle 2 5 9 242 508 895 5.1 10.7 18.8 
Gelderland pigs 5 9 13 273 501 734 5.7 10.5 15.4 
Noord-
Brabant 
pigs 3 6 11 166 399 779 3.5 8.4 16.4 
vaccination in 5km 
Gelderland cattle 2 5 10 140 305 546 2.9 6.4 11.5 
Overijssel cattle 2 4 8 210 457 780 4.4 9.6 16.4 
Gelderland pigs 4 8 12 233 440 676 4.9 9.2 14.2 
Noord-
Brabant 
pigs 3 6 10 166 370 674 3.5 7.8 14.2 
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Appendix 4 
From the OiE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (www.oie.int) 
 
 
Article 8.5.8. 
 
Recovery of free status 
1. When an FMD outbreak or FMDV infection occurs in an FMD free country or 
zone where vaccination is not practised, one of the following waiting periods 
is required to regain the status of FMD free country or zone where vaccina-
tion is not practised: 
a. 3 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy and serological 
surveillance are applied in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46.; 
or 
b. 3 months after the slaughter of all vaccinated animals where a stamping-
out policy, emergency vaccination and serological surveillance are ap-
plied in accordance with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46.; or 
c. 6 months after the last case or the last vaccination (according to the 
event that occurs the latest), where a stamping-out policy, emergency 
vaccination not followed by the slaughtering of all vaccinated animals, 
and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Articles 
8.5.40. to 8.5.46., provided that a serological survey based on the de-
tection of antibodies to non-structural proteins of FMDV demonstrates 
the absence of infection in the remaining vaccinated population. 
 
Where a stamping-out policy is not practised, the above waiting periods do 
not apply, and Article 8.5.2. or 8.5.4. applies. 
 
2. When an FMD outbreak or FMDV infection occurs in an FMD free country or 
zone where vaccination is practised, one of the following waiting periods is 
required to regain the status of FMD free country or zone where vaccination 
is practised: 
a. 6 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy, emergency 
vaccination and serological surveillance in accordance with Articles 
8.5.40. to 8.5.46. are applied, provided that the serological surveillance 
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based on the detection of antibodies to non-structural proteins of FMDV 
demonstrates the absence of virus circulation; or 
b. 18 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy is not applied, 
but emergency vaccination and serological surveillance in accordance 
with Articles 8.5.40. to 8.5.46. are applied, provided that the serological 
surveillance based on the detection of antibodies to non-structural pro-
teins of FMDV demonstrates the absence of virus circulation. 
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